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Notes 
MISSING THE MARK:  THE SEARCH FOR AN 
EFFECTIVE CLASS CERTIFICATION PROCESS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Class certification is one of the most hotly contested issues in class 
action litigation today due to the fact that virtually all certified classes 
settle their claims.1  In class actions brought under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(b)(3) (“Rule 23(b)(3)”), the general rule is that after a 
federal court finds a class untenable, members of the alleged class that 
were not named in the original proceedings are free to certify the class in 
a different jurisdiction.2  Defendants cannot argue collateral estoppel 
against these absent class members because the absent class members 
did not have a chance to litigate the certification issue in the original 
proceeding.3  In fact, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in In re General 
Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Products Liability Litigation,4 held 
that it had no power over putative class members5 in a Rule 23(b)(3) 
action because it had not afforded the class due process.6  However, the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires 
                                                 
1 See Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the Rulemaking 
Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 143 (1996) (noting that in the federal districts surveyed, 
between 62% and 100% of the certified class actions settled, while in other cases, between 
20% and 30% settled); see also Richard A. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy in Class 
Representation, 82 TEX. L. REV. 287, 289 (2003) (stating that class actions do not usually go to 
trial but end in settlements that are really an elaborate set of new rights for the class 
members in relation to the defendants). 
2 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod., 
134 F.3d 133, 141 (3d Cir. 1998) [hereinafter GM Trucks II].  This Note deals exclusively 
with attempts to certify classes under Rule 23(b)(3) and does not discuss Rule 23(b)(1) or 
Rule 23(b)(2) class actions, although much of the reasoning may apply to those classes.  See 
generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).  Further, this Note recognizes that plaintiffs’ pleadings may 
contain allegations that a class fits into more than one category, or the class may be denied 
for failure to meet the requirements of Rule 23(a).  See infra notes 70-72 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of the general requirements for certification under Rule 23(a).  
However, this Note addresses any situation in which it is pled that the class is certifiable 
under Rule 23(b)(3). 
3 See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330 (1979).  
4 134 F.3d 133 (3d Cir. 1998). 
5 A “putative class member” is a member of an alleged or supposed class for which the 
plaintiff is seeking certification.  See generally BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 574 (2d Pocket Ed. 
2001). 
6 GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d at 141. 
Bertsch: Missing the Mark:  The Search for an Effective Class Certificatio
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2004
96 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
 
Products Liability Litigation,7 recently held that it could exercise power 
over the entire putative class.8  This finding allowed the court to use its 
power under the All Writs Act9 to enjoin the entire putative class from 
additional certification attempts.10  The court also held that this situation 
fell within an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, which generally 
prevents federal courts from staying pending state court litigation. 11 
The Seventh Circuit’s ruling solved some of the problems associated 
with allowing numerous certification attempts by putative class 
members.12  However, it did not afford due process to the putative class 
before enjoining it.13  Traditionally, in order to bind someone in a Rule 
23(b)(3) class action, due process requires adequate representation, 
notice, an opportunity to be heard, and the right to request exclusion 
from the class.14  However, the Seventh Circuit found power to bind an 
entire putative class based only on adequate representation.15 
The tension between the divergent approaches taken by the Third 
Circuit and Seventh Circuit is illustrated by the following hypothetical.16  
Assume that StarBrothers, Inc. has marketed a defective table saw that 
injures users in all fifty states.  Albert, one of the injured users of the 
product, attempts to have a nationwide class certified against 
StarBrothers in federal court, but his motion to certify is denied because 
the nationwide class was not proper.  Although StarBrothers used many 
resources litigating this issue and was successful in doing so, its battle 
would not be over.  Other product users that were not involved in the 
first action could bring subsequent actions in different jurisdictions to try 
to get the class certified, and StarBrothers would have no basis to argue 
collateral estoppel because these new plaintiffs were absent from the 
original proceedings.17  Therefore, StarBrothers would be forced to 
litigate the class certification issue again.  Certification attempts could 
                                                 
7 333 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Bridgestone/Firestone]. 
8 Id.  at 769. 
9 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000); see infra note 169 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
the Act. 
10 Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 769. 
11 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000); see infra notes 189-94, 216-18 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the Act. 
12 See infra Parts III.B, IV.A. 
13 See infra Part III.B, IV.B.2. 
14 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985). 
15 Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 769. 
16 This hypothetical is fictional and was created by the author for the purpose of 
illustration. 
17 See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330 (1979). 
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continue as long as there were willing plaintiffs and proper forums.  
Further, if another court certifies the same class rejected by the federal 
court, the federal court’s decision to deny class certification is rendered 
meaningless.18 
Alternatively, StarBrothers could ask the federal court to enjoin the 
other injured consumers from attempting to certify the class using its 
power under the All Writs Act.19  Using the Third Circuit’s approach, an 
exercise of power over those not previously before the court would be 
improper.20  However, under the Seventh Circuit’s approach, the court 
could prevent all the injured persons from attempting to certify the class 
in another forum based merely on finding that their interests were 
adequately represented by the named plaintiffs.21  Under this approach, 
the court could even withhold notice and the opportunity to be heard 
from those being enjoined.22 
Typically when a class is certified under Rule 23(b)(3), due process 
requires that absent class members be given adequate representation, 
notice, an opportunity to be heard, and the right to request exclusion 
from the class in order to bind the absent members by the judgment.23  
When applying this standard to members of putative classes after 
certification has been denied, both the Third Circuit and the Seventh 
Circuit failed to come to an appropriate result.24  By examining the 
history of binding out-of-state defendants and absent class members, this 
Note will demonstrate that there is power to bind putative class 
members only when notice, an opportunity to be heard, and adequate 
representation are given.25 
                                                 
18 See infra Part IV.A, which discusses this issue and other problems associated with 
repeated certification attempts. 
19 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000); see infra note 169 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
this Act. 
20 See GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d 133, 141 (3d Cir. 1998). 
21 See Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d 763, 768-769 (7th Cir. 2003).  In this hypothetical, 
the absent class members filed their actions after the federal court had decided the 
certification issue.  However, if the actions were concurrent with the federal court action, 
the Anti-Injunction Act would prevent the federal court from enjoining the state court 
proceedings.  See infra notes 189-94, 216-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
circuit split regarding whether this situation fits into one of the exceptions to the Anti-
Injunction Act. 
22 See infra Part IV.B for a discussion of the due process implications of this method. 
23 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985). 
24 See infra Part IV. 
25 See infra Part III.B.2. 
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Part II of this Note first discusses traditional personal jurisdiction, 
followed by the bases for gaining power over absent class members in 
the absence of personal jurisdiction, with an emphasis on what due 
process protections are required.26  Part III describes the current circuit 
split regarding whether there is power to bind members of putative 
classes after a court denies certification.27  The Third Circuit effectively 
refused to exercise power over the putative class by requiring the right to 
opt out to be given.28  However, the Seventh Circuit exercised its 
injunctive power based solely on a showing of adequate representation.29  
Part IV describes the problems associated with both of these approaches 
and attempts to find an appropriate balance of the competing interests.30  
Part V proposes an amendment to Rule 23(c) which would allow federal 
courts to enjoin the putative class members from further attempts to 
certify the same class found untenable by a federal court.31  However, the 
basis for this power must come by providing putative class members 
notice, an opportunity to be heard, and adequate representation.32  The 
proposed change to Rule 23(c) would require merely the best notice 
practicable and not individual notice.33 Additionally, because the 
defendant is put into the plaintiff’s position when seeking an injunction, 
courts should have the power to require the defendant to reimburse the 
plaintiff for the costs of notice if an injunction is issued.34 
II.  POWER TO BIND ABSENT MEMBERS OF CERTIFIED RULE 23(B)(3) CLASSES 
Generally, in order to be bound by a judgment, one must be subject 
to personal jurisdiction and served with process.35  However, both Rule 
23 and Supreme Court jurisprudence create an exception to this rule for 
absent class members in class actions.36  This exception is applicable to 
members of Rule 23(b)(3) classes when notice, an opportunity to be 
heard, the right to request exclusion from the class (“opt out”), and 
adequate representation are afforded.37  However, even in the absence of 
                                                 
26 See infra Part II. 
27 See infra Part III. 
28 GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d 133, 141 (3d Cir. 1998). 
29 See Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d 763, 768-69 (7th Cir. 2003). 
30 See infra Part IV. 
31 See infra Part V. 
32 See infra Part V. 
33 See infra Part V. 
34 See infra Part V. 
35 See infra notes 39, 44 and accompanying text. 
36 See infra Part II.B.1-2. 
37 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985). 
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these due process protections, absent class members may still be treated 
as parties for some procedural events.38 
A. Traditional Personal Jurisdiction 
Generally, due process requires that a court have personal 
jurisdiction over a person in order to bind him to a decision.39  The 
Supreme Court created an elaborate set of rules for determining when 
personal jurisdiction exists.40  Additionally, in order for a state court to 
exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, there must 
be power to do so conferred by statute, typically referred to as a long-
arm statute.41  Long-arm statutes either enumerate acts that give courts 
jurisdiction or allow any exercise of jurisdiction consistent with due 
process.42  A federal court’s ability to exercise personal jurisdiction is 
determined by the same inquiry as that of the state courts in which the 
federal court sits.43  Finally, due process requires that notice be given to 
the party over whom the court will exercise power in order to perfect the 
jurisdiction.44 
                                                 
38 See infra Part II.C. 
39 See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980) (citing 
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732-33 (1877) for the proposition that “[a] judgment rendered 
in violation of due process is void in the rendering State and is not entitled to full faith and 
credit elsewhere”).  The requirement of personal jurisdiction is a liberty interest derived 
from the Due Process Clause, and thus, it can be waived.  Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. 
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03 (1982). 
40 See, e.g., Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 732. 
41 See, e.g., Eric D. Anderson, The Long Reach of Illinois’ Long-Arm Statute:  The Catch-All 
Provision, 84 ILL. B.J. 504, 504 (Oct. 1996) (comparing the long-arm statutes of several states). 
42 Compare Joshua S. Bauchner, New York’s Long Arm Statute Contains Provisions Suitable 
for Jurisdiction over Web Sites, 72 N.Y. ST B.A.J. (Mar.-Apr. 2000) (citing Beacon Enters. Inc. v. 
Menzies, 715 F.2d 757, 764 n.6 (2d Cir. 1983) for the proposition that New York’s long-arm 
statute does not extend to the limits of due process) with Connie M. Ericson, Casenote 
CMMC v. Salinas:  The Texas Long-Arm Statute Does Not Reach French Equipment 
Manufacturer (But Maybe It Should), 20 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 493, 496 n.22 (1998) (citing 
Helicopteros Nactionales de Columbia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 412-13 (1984) for the 
proposition that the Texas long-arm statute confers jurisdiction to the limits of due 
process). 
43 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (“Service of a summons . . . is effective to establish 
jurisdiction over the person of a defendant (A) who could be subjected to the jurisdiction of 
a court of general jurisdiction in the state in which the district court is located.”).  But see 
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(B), (C), and (D) (providing exceptions to the general rule for those 
joined under Rule 14 or Rule 19 and served in the United States within one hundred miles 
of where the summons was issued, those subject to federal interpleader jurisdiction, or 
when authorized by a federal statute). 
44 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291 (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Trust Co., 339 
U.S. 306, 313-14 (1950)).  Ineffective service will prevent a court from gaining personal 
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Originally, in Pennoyer v. Neff, 45 the Supreme Court held that due 
process required a party to be present within the borders of a state in 
order for a court to have personal jurisdiction over the party.46  This 
notion of territoriality was driven by ideas of state sovereignty, and it 
dominated the personal jurisdiction doctrine for almost seventy-five 
years, forcing courts to engage in intellectual gymnastics in order to 
reach equitable results.47  Many exceptions to the territoriality-based 
Pennoyer rules existed, including some recognized by the Pennoyer Court 
itself.48  Other courts created exceptions, including the implied consent 
fiction.49  A classic example of courts using the implied consent fiction 
                                                                                                             
jurisdiction.  See Debra Lyn Bassett, U.S. Class Actions Go Global:  Transactional Class Actions 
and Personal Jurisdiction, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 41, 47 (2003); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 4 (listing the 
notice requirements to be used in federal court proceedings). 
45 95 U.S. at 714. 
46 Id. at 733 (stating that in order to have a valid judgment in personam, power must be 
exerted over the defendant by service of process in the state or by voluntary appearance). 
47 See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 202 (1977) (discussing the rigidity of the 
territoriality-based Pennoyer approach). 
48 One exception recognized in Pennoyer was that of in rem jurisdiction.  95 U.S. at 724.  
(stating that if someone had property within a state, and the property was attached in 
accordance with local law, he could be bound by a judgment only to the extent of the 
property involved).  However, the Supreme Court later came to rethink its in rem analysis.  
Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212 (reasoning that it can no longer accept the fiction that in rem 
jurisdiction is merely an assertion of power over the property, and not over the person, and 
thus “all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards 
set forth in International Shoe and its progeny”).  A second exception recognized in Pennoyer 
is that a state has the power to adjudicate the status of a resident, such as in a divorce case, 
in which the defendant is a non-resident.  95 U.S. at 734-35; see Allan R. Stein, Styles of 
Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 696 
(1987) (arguing that this meant a state’s courts always had power over residents, even 
when they were not present).  A third exception was that a state may require non-residents 
that enter into partnerships or contracts within the state to appoint an agent within the 
state for service of process or a place in which service may be left, and if they do not, the 
state may designate a public officer for that purpose.  Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 735.  The final 
exception recognized in Pennoyer was that a corporation, by doing business in a state, 
consented to suit in that state.  Id.; see Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 202 (citing Int’l Harvester Co. v. 
Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914) for the proposition that this exception was expanded by the 
idea that corporations doing business in a state were considered “present” in the state).  It 
became clear, however, that courts were really attempting to determine if it was fair to 
exercise jurisdiction over these corporations.  See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 
F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930). 
49 See Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03 
(1982) (stating that personal jurisdiction is a waivable due process right each individual 
possesses, and thus, “[a] variety of legal arrangements have been taken to represent express 
or implied consent to the personal jurisdiction of the court”).  The Court went on to list a 
number of instances in which consent to jurisdiction was found.  Id. at 704; see Nat’l Equip. 
Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316 (1964) (stating that a contract may, by its terms, bind 
parties to jurisdiction); Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67-68 (1938) (finding plaintiffs 
consented to cross-claims by bringing action); St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 356 (1882) 
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involved an out-of-state motorist who the Supreme Court held 
consented to the appointment of a state official as his agent for service of 
process in civil actions merely because he operated his car on the state’s 
roads.50 
In 1945, the Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington51 
released itself from the territoriality-based Pennoyer approach and 
moved to a standard based on reasonableness.52  In International Shoe, the 
Court declared that in order to gain personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant not present in the forum state, “due process requires only that 
. . . he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance 
of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.’”53  This standard protects defendants from the 
burden of litigating in a distant forum and ensures that states do not 
infringe on the sovereignty of other states.54 
The Supreme Court subsequently elaborated on the minimum 
contacts test.55  In the minimum contacts test, the initial inquiry is 
whether there has been some act by which the defendant purposely 
availed himself of “the benefits and protections of the forum’s laws.”56  
In conducting this inquiry, the court must consider whether the 
                                                                                                             
(holding that a state could infer consent from a business that registers to conduct business 
in the state); Victory Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 
336 F.2d 354, 363 (2d Cir. 1964) (finding consent in an arbitration agreement).  But see 
Olberding v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 346 U.S. 338, 340-41 (1953) (stating that jurisdiction gained 
in this way is not based on consent at all, for the party could protest to all ends and still be 
subject to jurisdiction); Stein, supra note 48, at 696 (“No one really believed this fiction—
clearly the defendant’s ‘consent’ was either coerced or unintended—but the fiction was 
essential to the maintenance of the Pennoyer framework.”). 
50 See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 355 (1927). 
51 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
52 Id. at 317; see Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1985) (noting that technological 
progress has allowed for increased interstate commerce and better communications and 
transportation, which make it easier for defendants to defend in foreign states and have 
forced the requirements for personal jurisdiction to move from the rigid Pennoyer paradigm 
to the minimum contacts standard of International Shoe). 
53 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).  Due 
process does not allow for a binding judgment in personam against a defendant with no 
contacts, ties, or relations to the state.  Id. at 319. 
54 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). 
55 Bassett, supra note 44, at 52 (stating that there is no consistent, comprehensive way to 
determine if minimum contacts exist and that the Supreme Court has essentially decided 
the issue case by case). 
56 Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253; see Asahi Metal Indus., Co. v. Sup. Ct. of California, 480 U.S. 
102, 108-09 (1987); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985); McGee v. Int’l 
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). 
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defendant can reasonably foresee being sued in the forum state.57  Once a 
court has established that there has been purposeful availment, it must 
determine whether it is reasonable to exercise jurisdiction, or in other 
words, if it would be consistent with traditional notions of “fair play and 
substantial justice.”58  This reasonableness inquiry entails considering 
many factors, including the burden placed on the defendant, the state’s 
interest in adjudicating the claim and providing its citizens with relief, 
the plaintiff’s interests, and judicial efficiency.59 
Additionally, notice of a pending action is necessary to perfect 
personal jurisdiction and inform those who will be deprived of their life, 
liberty, or property by that action.60  The Supreme Court, in Mullane v. 
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,61 held that notice reasonably calculated 
under the circumstances to alert the interested parties and give them an 
opportunity to present objections is an “elementary and fundamental 
requirement of due process.”62  Thus, in order to exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant, he must receive service of process that is 
reasonably calculated to reach him.63  This means that defendants may 
                                                 
57 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295-96 (rejecting the argument that a consumer 
unilaterally acting to bring a product produced by the defendant into the forum state is 
sufficient to create personal jurisdiction).  Although the Court has stated that a defendant 
placing a product into the stream of commerce and foreseeing that it will reach the forum 
will not create purposeful availment, that part of the decision was a 4-4 split with no 
precedental value.  See Asahi Metal Indus., 480 U.S. at 112 (plurality opinion).  Therefore, the 
many decisions taking an opposing view still are good law.  See, e.g., Bean Dredging Corp. 
v. Dredge Technology Corp., 744 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1984). 
58 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476; see Asahi Metal Indus., 480 U.S. at 114 (finding jurisdiction 
unreasonable based on the burden it would have placed on the defendant). 
59 Asahi Metal Indus., 480 U.S. at 113; see Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473-74 (stating that if 
there is purposeful availment, “it may well be unfair to allow them to escape having to 
account in other States for consequences that arise proximately from such activities”); 
Kulko v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 92, 98 (1978) (stating that the plaintiff’s interest in 
gaining effective relief and the interest in judicial economy must also be considered); 
McGee, 355 U.S. at 223 (noting that the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute 
must be considered in determining whether there are minimum contacts). 
60 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940); see U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
61 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 
62 Id.  Whether or not a type of notice is constitutional may depend on if it is “reasonably 
certain to inform those affected . . . or, where conditions do not reasonably permit such 
notice, that the form chosen is not substantially less likely to bring home notice than other 
of the feasible and customary substitutes.”  Id. at 315. 
63 See Bassett, supra note 44, at 82 n.31 (citing Omni Capital Int’l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 
484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987); Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1946)). 
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be bound by a judgment without actually receiving notice if it was 
reasonably calculated to reach them.64 
Absent class members in class actions usually lack minimum 
contacts with the forum state, and thus courts do not have personal 
jurisdiction over them.65  However, class actions can still go forward 
because there is no need for a court to have personal jurisdiction over an 
absent class member in order to bind him to a judgment.66  Rule 23 and 
Supreme Court jurisprudence offer the basis for this exercise of power in 
the absence of traditional personal jurisdiction.67 
B. Gaining Power over Absent Class Members in Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions 
1. Rule 23 Expressly Grants Power to Bind Absent Class Members 
Rule 23 provides the basic procedure for litigating class actions in 
federal courts, and it explicitly provides for power over absent class 
members.68  The Rule was amended in December 2003, but the changes 
only codified existing practice regarding notice, settlement, and 
appointment of class counsel.69  Every class action certified in federal 
                                                 
64 See, e.g., Miedreich v. Lauenstein, 232 U.S. 236, 246-47 (1914) (holdingthat due process 
was afforded even though defendant was not served and return of service was falsely 
made). 
65 Nagareda, supra note 1, at 293. 
66 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810 (1985). 
67 See infra Part II.B.1-2. 
68 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). 
69 See Linda S. Mullenix, No Exit:  Mandatory Class Actions in the New Millennium and the 
Blurring of Categorical Imperatives, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 177, 246 n.3 [hereinafter Mullenix, 
No Exit] (stating that the proposed additions of Rule 23(g) and (h) were simply the 
codification of existing practice in federal courts).  The amendments provide no resolution 
to the problems addressed by this Note concerning whether there is a basis for power over 
putative class members after certification is denied.  See infra Part IV.A-B.  Rule 23(c)(2) was 
amended to provide a more efficient notice process.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).  There 
was also a revision explicitly giving courts discretion to require notice in (b)(1) and (b)(2) 
class actions.  See id. 23(c)(2)(A).  The language of (c)(1) was slightly altered to change the 
time when the certification decision should be made.  See id. 23(c)(1).  Prior to December 1, 
2003, this rule required a decision as soon as practicable after the action started.  See FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23 cmt.(c)(1) (2003 Amendment).  The drafters believed that the “as soon as 
practicable” standard was not fitting with the practices of courts or the reasons for delaying 
the certification decision.  Id.  Rule 23(e) was amended to more clearly define the 
procedures for approving a class action settlement, now explicitly allowing for a fairness 
hearing, objections by class members, and refusal of a settlement by the court if another 
opportunity to opt out is not given.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1) – (4).  Finally, Rule 23(g) was 
added, stating the procedure for choosing class counsel and requiring that class counsel 
adequately represent the class, and Rule 23(h) sets out the guidelines for awarding attorney 
fees.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g), (h). 
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court still must meet the requirements of “numerosity, commonality, and 
typicality.”70  In other words, there must be so many potential class 
members that joinder is not feasible, there must be questions of fact or 
law common to the class, and the class representative must have claims 
that are “typical of the claims or defenses of the class.”71  Additionally, 
Rule 23(a) requires that the named class representative provide adequate 
representation at all times.72 
Rule 23(b) creates three distinct types of class actions.73  The Rule 
23(b)(1) class exists when individual suits would risk inconsistent 
judgments, creating incompatible standards for the other party or if the 
individual actions would substantially affect the interests of non-
parties.74  The Rule 23(b)(2) class action is used when the opposing party 
has acted in a way that is applicable generally to the class, making 
injunctive or declaratory relief proper.75  The Rule 23(b)(3) class action is 
used if “questions of law or fact common to the members of the class 
                                                 
70 See, e.g., John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1419, 1423 (2003). 
71 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); see Lukenas v. Bryce’s Mountain Resort, Inc., 538 F.2d 594, 596 
(4th Cir. 1976) (noting that all federal class actions must satisfy the requirements of Rule 
23(a)). 
72 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).  Also, Rule 23(g) provides that “[a]n attorney appointed to serve 
as class counsel must fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.”  FED R. CIV. 
P. 23(g)(1)(B).  See infra note 96 and accompanying text for a discussion of the requirement 
of adequate representation. 
73 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).  It is generally accepted that the remedy sought is the main 
determinate in deciding whether to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(1), (2), or (3).  Graham 
C. Lilly, Modeling Class Actions:  The Representative Suit as an Analytical Tool, 81 NEB. L. REV. 
1008, 1031 (2003). 
74 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1).  See, e.g., Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 
1193 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(A)); Ortiz v. Fibreboard 
Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 833-38 (1999) (discussing certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) and noting 
that that there is no right to notice or to opt out of class actions certified under (b)(1)). 
75 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).  See, e.g,. In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 343 F.3d 331, 338-39 
(2003) (describing certification under Rule 23 (b)(2)).  In (b)(2) class actions, notice is not 
required.  See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 397 (1975).  Notice is discretionary both in 
class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2).  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A) (“For 
any class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (2), the court may direct appropriate notice to the 
class.”) (2003 Amendment).  Before the 2003 Amendment, Rule 23(d)(2) was used by courts 
to require notice in Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) actions at their discretion.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(d)(2) (“The court may make appropriate orders: . . . (2) requiring, for the protection of 
the members of the class . . . that notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to 
some or all of the members of any step in the action.”); Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 952 
(2003) (stating that a right to opt out may be required by the court under Rule 23(d)(2) for 
classes certified under Rule 23(b)(2)).   
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predominate over any questions affecting only individual members”76 
and a class action is the best method available to adjudicate the 
controversy.77  The following list is the six requirements for bringing a 
class action under Rule 23(b)(3): predominance, superiority, numerosity, 
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation.78 
Once a class is certified under Rule 23(b)(3), due process requires 
that absent class members also receive notice, an opportunity to be 
heard, and the right to opt out of the litigation in order to be bound by a 
class action judgment.79  The notice must be “the best notice practicable 
under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who 
can be identified through reasonable effort.”80  In addition, the notice 
                                                 
76 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).  The precursor to the Rule 23(b)(3) class action was the 
“spurious” class action, which was not binding on absent class members.  JACK H. 
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 739 (1999); see Lilly, supra note 73, at 1015 (noting 
that the spurious class action was often considered little more than a liberal joinder device). 
77 FED. R. CIV. P.  23(b)(3).  The Rule also gives factors to use when determining if a class 
action is the most effective way to adjudicate the claim, which include: 
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the 
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of 
any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or 
against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of 
concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) 
the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class 
action. 
Id.  The official comment to this section states that this list is not exhaustive.  FED. R. CIV. P. 
23 cmt. (b)(3) (1966 Amendment).  Though actions that meet the requirements of Rule 
23(b)(3) are not as convincingly fit for class treatment as those that meet the requirements 
of Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2), they do serve the purpose of saving time, effort, and expense, as 
well as promoting uniform decisions for class members and opposing parties.  Id., cmt. 
(b)(3) (1966 Amendment). 
78 Bronsteen & Fiss, supra note 70, at 1423; cf. Mullenix, No Exit, supra note 69, at 215 
(stating that classes certified under Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) do not need to meet the 
predominance and superiority requirements for certification under Rule 23 (b)(3)). 
79 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4), (c)(2)(B). 
80 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).  This rule was amended in 2003 and now states: 
The notice must concisely and clearly state in plain, easily understood 
language: the nature of the action, the definition of the class certified, 
the class claims, issues, or defenses, that a class member may enter an 
appearance through counsel if the member so desires, that the court 
will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion, 
stating when and how members may elect to be excluded, and the 
binding effect of a class judgment on class members under Rule 
23(c)(3). 
Id.  The Rule previously stated: 
The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude the 
member from the class if the member so requests by a specified date; 
(B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members 
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must state that the absent class members will be bound if they do not opt 
out of the class action.81 
2. The Supreme Court Sets the Due Process Standard for Binding 
Absent Class Members 
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of power over absent class 
members in Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts.82  This case involved a 
nationwide “damages” class action brought in a Kansas state court.83  
Although the case dealt with Kansas class action law, the decision 
interpreted the Due Process Clause and is applicable to Rule 23(b)(3) 
class actions in federal court.84  Specifically in Shutts, the defendant 
leased land in several different states in order to extract and produce 
natural gas.85  Over 28,000 people were owed interest on delayed royalty 
payments from the defendant because they possessed rights to these 
land leases, and many did not have minimum contacts with Kansas.86  A 
class was certified under Kansas law, and a judgment was issued in 
favor of the class, which was affirmed by the Kansas Supreme Court.87 
The defendant appealed to the United States Supreme Court, 
contending that due process prevented the Kansas court from 
                                                                                                             
who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not 
request exclusion may, if the member desires, enter an appearance 
through counsel. 
 Id. 23(c)(2) (1966 Amendment); see infra Part II.B.3 for an analysis of the standards and 
procedures of notice in class actions.  There are additional provisions in Rule 23 that 
require notice to members of any certified class in certain situations.  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(e)(1)(B) (mandating that before a case can be dismissed or settled, reasonable notice be 
given to all class members that would be bound by a judgment).  Another example is that 
Rule 23(h) mandates that before awarding attorney’s fees, a motion must be made and 
reasonable notice must be given to all class members so that they have an opportunity to 
object.  Id. 23(h)(1) (2003 Amendment). 
81 See Id. 23(c)(2)(B); see also supra notes 81, 99-104 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the right to opt out of a class. 
82 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (holding that absent, nonresident class members can be bound to a 
class judgment if due process is afforded).  Three years earlier, the Court had a chance to 
answer the question of whether it could bind an absent class member without traditional 
personal jurisdiction in Gillette Co. v. Miner.  456 U.S. 914 (1982).  After granting certiorari, 
the Court dismissed the case because the lower court’s decision was not final, and the case 
settled on remand.  Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in 
Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1, 6-7 (1986). 
83 Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 679 P.2d 1159, 1165 (Kan. 1984). 
84 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 799. 
85 Shutts, 679 P.2d at 1165. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
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adjudicating the claims of the absent class members because the absent 
class members did not have minimum contacts with Kansas.88  However, 
the Court stated that the minimum contacts test does not apply to absent 
class members and proceeded to define the due process requirements for 
gaining power over absent class members.89  These requirements were 
notice, an opportunity to be heard, an ability to opt out of the class, and 
adequate representation.90  However, the Court limited its holding to 
class actions dealing only with “claims wholly or predominately for 
money judgments.”91 
                                                 
88 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 799. 
89 Id. at 811-12.  This decision was made on appeal from the Kansas Supreme Court; 
thus, the Shutts Court was interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. (citing U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV).  Nevertheless, the holding of Shutts has been applied to the Fifth 
Amendment.  See, e.g., In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 221 F.3d 870, 881 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(citing U.S. CONST. amend. V). 
90 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812. 
91 Id. at 811-12.  Footnote 3 states: 
Our holding today is limited to those class actions which seek to bind 
[class members] concerning claims wholly or predominately for money 
judgments.  We intimate no view concerning other types of class 
actions, such as those seeking equitable relief.  Nor, of course, does our 
discussion of personal jurisdiction address class actions where the 
jurisdiction is asserted against a defendant class. 
Id.  This limitation created the “Shutts” problem, which involves whether mandatory 
classes that include claims for both equitable relief and damages, such as some classes 
certified under Rule 23(b)(2) in federal courts, should be afforded the same protections as 
classes predominately for damages.  Linda S. Mullenix, Getting to Shutts, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 
727, 730 (1998) [hereinafter Mullenix, Getting to Shutts].  See generally Eubanks v. Billington, 
110 F.3d 87, 92 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that courts have allowed monetary damages with 
declaratory or injunctive relief in Rule 23(b)(2) class actions if the monetary relief does not 
predominate).  The majority rule in deciding whether to afford the right to opt out is to 
consider the predominate relief sought.  Mullenix, Getting to Shutts, supra, at 737.  The 
actual standard courts use is very hard to determine.  Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due 
Process, and the Right to Opt Out of Class Actions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1068 (2002).  
The Supreme Court had a chance to resolve whether class members of classes certified 
under Rule 23(b)(2) that include any claims for monetary damages fall within the purview 
of Shutts and should be given the right to opt out.  See Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 
117 (1994).  In that case, the district court held that an opt-out right was not proper, and the 
Third Circuit affirmed the holding without issuing a written opinion.  In re Real Estate Title 
& Settlement Servs. Antitrust Litig., 815 F.2d 695 (3d Cir. 1987).  Essentially the same action 
was filed in another district court and on appeal of the dismissal, the Ninth Circuit held 
that the case was controlled by Shutts and that due process required a right to opt out if 
monetary claims are involved.  Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 392 (9th Cir. 
1992).  This decision essentially stated that claimants must separate the damage claims 
from equitable claims and certify the damage claims under Rule 23(b)(3).  Mullenix, Getting 
to Shutts, supra, at 737-38 (citing Ticor Title, 982 F.2d at 392).  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari, but then dismissed the case as having granted it improvidently.  Ticor Title, 511 
U.S. at 118. 
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In declaring that the minimum contacts test was inapplicable to 
absent class members, the Court stated that the test was designed to 
protect defendants from distant forum abuse when their lack of contacts 
with the forum made it unfair to force them to defend there.92  Absent 
class plaintiffs are rarely subject to counterclaims, cross-claims, fees, 
litigation costs, or liability for damages.93  Therefore, the burden 
defendants face is greater than the burden faced by absent class 
members, which justifies application of the minimum contacts test to 
defendants only.94 
Although the Court refused to provide absent class plaintiffs with 
the same protection as out-of-state defendants, it did require some 
safeguards to protect the chose in action, which is a recognized property 
right.95  It held that in order to be bound by a judgment in a class action 
wholly or predominately for a money judgment, the class representative 
must provide adequate representation at all times.96  In addition, the best 
                                                 
92 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 807; cf. Carlough v. Amchem Prod., Inc., 10 F.3d 189, 199 (3d Cir. 
1993) (citing In re Real Estate Title, 869 F.2d 760, 766 (3d Cir. 1989)) (“The procedural 
protections of [Rule 23] replace the rigid rules of personal jurisdiction in this context and 
are all that is needed to meet the requirements of due process.”). 
93 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 810. 
94 Id. at 811; cf. Bassett, supra note 44, at 59 (reasoning that because applying the 
minimum contacts test to absent class members would have virtually eliminated multistate 
classes, this decision was necessary to maintain an efficient judicial system). 
95 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 811-12.  A “chose in action” is a “right to receive or recover a debt, 
demand, or damages on a cause of action ex contractu or for a tort or omission of a duty.”  
Kevin Pennell, Note, On the Assignment of Legal Malpractice Claims:  A Contractual Solution to 
a Contractual Problem, 82 TEX. L. REV. 481, 483 (2003) (quoting Picadilly, Inc. v. Raikos, 582 
N.E.2d 338, 339 n.1 (Ind. 1991)).  There are also protections built into the federal class action 
rules that help justify not applying the minimum contacts test to absent class plaintiffs.  See 
Bassett, supra note 44, at 67; see supra Part II.B.1 for a discussion of Rule 23. 
96 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812 (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43, 45 (1940)); see FED. 
R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (requiring a judicial finding that the class representative will fairly and 
adequately represent the interests of the class in order for certification to be proper); FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(B) (requiring that the class counsel also fairly and adequately represent the 
class).  It has been suggested that the requirement of adequate representation be applied 
less stringently when there is an opportunity to opt out of the class.  John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Class Action Accountability:  Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 370, 438 (2000).  Nevertheless, under Rule 23(b)(3), absent class members 
that do not opt out may be able to challenge the adequacy of representation either in a 
subsequent proceeding or by intervening in the original action.  Lilly, supra note 73, at 1035.  
The majority view is that the original forum is the appropriate court to hear attacks on the 
adequacy of representation.  Henry Paul Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion 
Against Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1148, 1150 (1998) (citing In re 
“Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1432-33 (2d Cir. 1993) for the proposition 
that there is a constitutional obligation to hear collateral attacks regarding the adequacy of 
representation).  However, Professor Monaghan argues that because class representatives 
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notice practicable under the circumstances must be given to the class 
members, including individual notice if the absent class members can be 
located through reasonable effort.97  The notice must apprise absent class 
members of their right to be heard in the action,98 and inform them of 
their right to opt out of the proceedings.99 
The Court did not require class members to affirmatively opt in to 
the class.100  Instead, it inferred their consent based on their failure to opt 
out of the class.101  The Court assumed consent was required and stated 
that the real question was what showing of consent was needed.102  
                                                                                                             
need to provide adequate representation until the judgment is made and because the 
chance to opt out ends before the judgment is made, there is a period of time in between 
the two which causes problems for the absent class member who may want to opt out 
based on something the representative does toward the end of the proceedings.  Id. at 1169.  
Because the class members do not impliedly consent to inadequate representation, there 
should be an opportunity to challenge the adequacy of representation in another forum.  Id. 
at 1169.  However, the counter to this argument is that it is not adequacy in fact that is 
required, but an adequate structure for determining adequacy of representation in the 
original forum, making it the appropriate place to determine adequacy.  Nagareda, supra 
note 1, at 313. 
97 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-
15 (1950)) (“The notice must be the best practicable, ‘reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them 
an opportunity to present their objections.’”).  See infra Part II.B.3 for a discussion of the 
notice requirements in certified class actions. 
98 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812; see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (requiring that the notice in Rule 
23(b)(3) class actions inform the class members of their right to be excluded from the class). 
99 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812.  This generally would be accomplished by sending an “opt 
out” form to the absent class members that would be executed and returned to the court.  
Id.  For a discussion of the split of authority regarding the necessity of a chance to opt out 
of Rule 23 (b)(2) that seek some money damages, see supra note 91. 
100 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812.  An opt-in requirement would cause class actions to lose their 
effectiveness in litigating multistate small claims cases.  Issacharoff, supra note 91, at 1064.  
To prevent the dramatic increase in transaction costs that this would have, and anticipating 
the lack of response from most class members with small claims, Shutts and subsequent 
cases hold that consent is assumed originally, and absent plaintiffs need only be given the 
opportunity to show a lack of consent.  Id.; see Miller & Crump, supra note 82, at 11-13 
(asserting that small claims would not survive an opt-in requirement, and parties with 
large claims are well-protected by the right to opt out of the class). 
101 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812; see Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779-81 (1984) 
(stating that anyone can consent to personal jurisdiction in any forum); Yeldell v. Tutt, 913 
F.2d 533, 539 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h) a party waives any 
objection to personal jurisdiction if it is not raised in the first responsive pleading with the 
court, but this merely sets the lower limit and does not preclude a court from inferring 
consent); see also Lilly, supra note 73, at 1031 (noting that because absent class members are 
impliedly consenting to jurisdiction for what is written in the notice, they are free to 
challenge issues and claims not listed in the notice). 
102 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812.  This is similar to the legal gymnastics courts used before 
International Shoe, when implied consent was often necessary to reach an equitable result 
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Inferring consent was necessary to protect the class members’ chose in 
action.103 
Implied consent, made possible through notice and the right to opt 
out, adequate representation, and the right to be heard, is required to 
afford due process and allow for constitutional power to bind absent 
class members.104  The linchpin to providing these due process 
protections is notice.105  As discussed above, in Rule 23(b)(3) class 
actions, notice acts as a conduit for inferring consent through refusal to 
opt out of the class.106  It is also “the single greatest safeguard against 
inadequate representation,”107 and the only way to provide a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard.108 
                                                                                                             
while staying within the bounds of the territoriality-based Pennoyer rules.  See supra notes 
49-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the implied consent fiction used by courts 
after Pennoyer.  Nevertheless, in 1977 the Supreme Court held that all assertions of personal 
jurisdiction need to be evaluated under the minimum contacts test, which could lead one to 
believe that Shutts was decided more based on fundamental fairness than on implied 
consent.  See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977).  Additionally, inferring consent 
from the refusal to opt out seems improper because normally there is personal jurisdiction 
followed by notice to perfect it, but in Shutts, notice was used to gain power to bind.  See 
Sarajane K. Walker, Note, Personal Jurisdiction and Multistate Plaintiff Class Actions: The 
Impact of World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 32 DRAKE L. REV. 441, 459 (1983) 
(arguing that a court lacking power to compel appearance arguably has no authority to 
compel a putative class member to opt in or opt out); Diane P. Wood, Adjudicatory 
Jurisdiction and Class Actions, 62 IND. L.J. 597, 620 (1987) (stating that the Shutts implied 
consent theory violates the general theory of consent because “a court with no power over 
an individual should have no power to attach adverse legal consequences to the 
individual’s refusal or neglect to answer a communication from that court”). 
103 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812 (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313); see Patrick Woolley, Rethinking 
the Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 571, 585-89 (1997) (describing the 
history of considering a cause of action to be a constitutionally protected property interest). 
104 See, e.g., In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 960 F.2d 285, 292 (2d Cir. 1992); 
Bassett, supra note 44, at 58-60; Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search for 
“Adequacy” in Class Actions:  A Critique of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 766 
n.3 (1998); cf. Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189, 200 (3d Cir. 1993) (interpreting 
Shutts to mean that there is no jurisdiction over absent class members that do not otherwise 
consent until after the opt out period has ended).  After a class is certified, there would still 
be no power over the putative class members until the opt out period has ended.  See In re 
Sulzer Hip Prosthesis and Knee Prosthesis Liab. Litig. No. 101CV9000, MDL 1401, 2001 WL 
1842158, at *2 n.3 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 20, 2001) (noting that at most this would be “a harmless 
initial jurisdictional overreach” that could be remedied). 
105 See infra Part II.B.3. 
106 See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 811-12. 
107 Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 679 P.2d 1159, 1171 (Kan. 1984) (citing Mullane, 339 
U.S. at 314). 
108 See infra Part II.B.3 
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3. Notice Is the Key to Gaining Power over Absent Class Members 
Rule 23(c)(2) sets the notice requirements for class actions in federal 
courts.109  The official comments to this rule cite to Mullane,110 and the 
rule itself requires that in all class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(3), 
the absent class members must receive the “best notice practicable under 
the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can 
be identified through reasonable effort.”111  The Supreme Court in Eisen 
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin112 upheld this standard for providing notice to 
absent class members and held that for the class members identifiable 
through reasonable efforts, first class mail afforded due process.113  In so 
                                                 
109 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2).  See supra note 80 for the text of Rule 23(c)(2).  The 
requirements for service on defendants are more rigorous than those imposed on notice to 
absent class members.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 cmt. (d)(2) (1966 Amendment) (stating that 
class notice need not meet the formalities of service of process on defendants).  “Although 
service by first-class mail is an option under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), if no acknowledgement of 
service is returned, personal service or service at the individual’s dwelling house is then 
required.”  Wood, supra note 102, at 621 (“This initial safeguard of the absentee’s interest is 
precisely what justifies a finding of waiver with respect to personal jurisdiction objections 
when the defendant appears and is silent, and it is lacking in Rule 23(c)(2).”). 
110 FED. R. CIV. P. 23, cmt. (d)(2) (1966 Amendment).  The official commentary noted that 
the mandatory notice under Rule 23(c)(2), when combined with the discretionary notice of 
Rule 23(d)(2), fulfills the due process requirements.  Id. (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314-15; 
Gart v. Cole, 263 F.2d 244, 248-49 (2d Cir. 1959); Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973, 979 
(2d Cir. 1952)). 
111 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2); see In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litig., 552 F.2d 1088, 
1105 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating that notice given under (c)(2) must be that which “a reasonable 
person would consider to be material in making an informed, intelligent decision of 
whether to opt out”).  However, the procedural safeguards offered by Rule 23(a) provide 
support for the idea that notice is not required when the class is certified under Rule 
23(b)(1) or (b)(2).  See Arthur R. Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 
299, 314-15 (1973) (stating that the due process concerns that are addressed by notice are 
adequately addressed by these requirements for certification in mandatory class actions).  
Professor Miller also notes that this reasoning is not persuasive in class actions certified 
under Rule 23(b)(3) because the groups lack the cohesiveness possessed by a class with 
similar interests or a class seeking an injunction or declaratory judgment common to all 
class members.  Id. at 315.  Further, class members of Rule 23(b)(3) class actions seek 
different damages, and have little cohesiveness, which the drafters took into account when 
determining that there needed to be mandatory notice to class members in Rule 23(b)(3) 
class actions.  Id. at 315-16.  In addition, notice costs in any context could easily cripple class 
actions not seeking damages.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 cmt (c)(2) (2003 Amendment). 
112 417 U.S. 156 (1974). 
113 Id. at 175.  The Eisen Court held that all 2,250,000 class members whose names and 
addresses could be identified through reasonable effort should receive notice via first-class 
mail even though to do so would be prohibitively expensive for the class representatives.  
Id. at 176.  It has been argued that this requirement should not be read literally, and notice 
should be more flexible to account for the enormous cost involved.  Miller, supra note 111, 
at 319-20.  
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holding, the Court was faithful to the wording of Rule 23(c)(2) and 
required best notice practicable with no express requirement of 
individual notice through reasonable efforts.114 
The Court’s decision in Shutts stretched the Eisen holding, which was 
based on an interpretation of Rule 23, into a broader due process 
requirement.115  Like the Eisen Court, the Shutts Court held that notice by 
first class mail not returned as undeliverable affords due process in Rule 
23(b)(3) class actions.116  However, these decisions set the minimum 
notice requirements, and Rule 23(d) can be used to set higher standards, 
such as certified mail or opting-in to the class.117  Even though certified 
mail would provide certainty of receipt and bolster the theory of implied 
consent, it is rarely required because it is usually prohibitively 
expensive.118 
Plaintiffs’ attorneys and courts face a daunting task when 
determining what constitutes the best notice practicable in class 
actions.119  The tremendous costs involved, especially when individual 
                                                 
114 Bronsteen & Fiss, supra note 70, at 1437. 
115 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 
314-15).  There were attempts by groups such as the litigation section of the American Bar 
Association to make notice in all class actions discretionary before Shutts.  Miller & Crump, 
supra note 82, at 31 n.217 (noting that a literal reading of Shutts suggests that a requirement 
of discretionary notice would be unconstitutional). 
116 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812.  Settlements of class actions raise additional concerns and call 
for added protections to be given to class members.  See In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up 
Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 778 (3d Cir. 1995).  If there is a proposed 
settlement in any class action certified under Rule 23, there must be notice given to the class 
members.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)(B) (“The court must direct notice in a reasonable manner 
to all class members who would be bound by a proposed settlement, voluntary dismissal, 
or compromise.”).  Notice of proposed settlement is necessary either when there is a 
settlement after certification or when a class is certified for settlement purposes.  FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23 cmt. (e)(1) (2003 Amendment).  This allows for an opportunity to be heard 
regarding the fairness of the terms of a proposed settlement.  Lilly, supra note 73, at 1032.  
In addition, the court may require a renewed opportunity to opt out as a prerequisite for 
certifying a settlement of the class claims.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(C)(3). 
117 David Crump, What Really Happens During Class Certification?  A Primer for the First-
Time Defense Attorney, 10 REV. LITIG. 1, 19 (1990) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d); Eisen, 417 U.S. 
at 175-77); see Klemow v. Time, Inc., 352 A.2d 12, 16-17 (Pa. 1976) (holding that 
Pennsylvania law required an opt-in for the absent class members to be bound).  These 
options may be beneficial to defendants in certain situations.  Cf. Greenhaw v. Lubbock 
County Beverage Ass’n, 721 F.2d 1019, 1024 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that in one case, there 
was a recovery fund of $2 million, but the class members were paid only $17,482). 
118 Miller & Crump, supra note 82, at 20. 
119 Willging, supra note 1, at 129.  In a survey of four federal district courts, it was found 
that in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, individual notice is almost always used, supplemented 
by publication in two-thirds of the cases, and rare use of the broadcast media.  Id. 
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notice is required, is an important issue to consider in Rule 23(b)(3) 
actions.120  Courts can add the cost of notice onto a judgment against the 
defendant.121  However, the Eisen Court struck down a procedure 
utilizing a preliminary determination on the merits to determine 
whether the defendant should have to pay some of the notice costs at the 
beginning of the suit.122  Therefore, class representatives still pay for 
notice.123  Nevertheless, there is often a clause in settlement agreements 
forcing defendants to pay for all or part of the notice costs.  This clause is 
especially effective if a class is certified for settlement purposes because 
the plaintiffs will not have to pay any of the notice costs at the beginning 
of the suit.124 
Many have argued that notice to class members is generally 
ineffective.125  Notice is generally sent to non-lawyers and is laden with 
legalese, which often causes it to be discarded.126  When an absent class 
member does not fully appreciate the significance of the notice, or even 
receive notice, the consent inferred is fictional.127  These concerns 
prompted the recent revision to Rule 23(c)(2), which gives specific notice 
requirements designed to make notice more effective.128  However, the 
drafters of the amendment noted that given the complex nature of class 
actions and the audience to which the notice is sent, there will inevitably 
be problems.129 
                                                 
120 Crump, supra note 117, at 19.  The cost of notice is often used by defendants to 
persuade plaintiffs not to bring class actions.  Id.  Most attorneys use class action notice 
companies in order to give notice to absent class members.  See Notice.com, 
http://www.notice.com (last visited Oct. 31, 2004) (supporting website for The Notice 
Company, which is based in Hingham, MA). 
121 Crump, supra note 117, at 19. 
122 Eisen, 417 U.S. at 178.  The Court reasoned that this procedure would have prejudiced 
to the defendant because the rules and procedures of civil trials would not be present, 
which may have affected the subsequent proceedings and placed a difficult burden on the 
defendant.  Id. 
123 Id. at 179. 
124 Willging, supra note 1, at 126-27 (noting that sometimes the named parties attempt to 
delay class notice until a settlement or decision on the merits is made, thus allowing the 
defendant to pay the notice costs). 
125 Id. 
126 See Miller & Crump, supra note 82, at 17. 
127 Id. at 17-18. 
128 See supra note 80 for a comparison of the new Rule 23(c)(2) and the one in place before 
December 1, 2003. 
129 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 cmt. (c)(2) (2003 Amendment). 
The direction that class-certification notice be couched in plain, easily 
understood language is a reminder of the need to work unremittingly 
at the difficult task of communicating with class members.  It is 
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 Notice also acts as a conduit for providing an opportunity to be 
heard.130  Once an absent class member receives notice, he can “enter an 
appearance through counsel.”131  This has been interpreted to mean that 
he can receive the motions, pleadings, and other filings in the litigation, 
as well as notice of hearings, in order to determine if he should 
intervene.132  If a class member chooses to intervene, he can present 
evidence, make arguments and motions, conduct discovery, and request 
an appeal of the class certification decision.133 
Clearly, the Court has stated that the presence of adequate 
representation, notice,  an opportunity to be heard, and a right to opt out 
will be enough to create the constitutional power necessary to bind 
absent class members to a judgment in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions.134  
                                                                                                             
difficult to provide information about most class actions that is both 
accurate and easily understood by class members who are not 
themselves lawyers.  Factual uncertainty, legal complexity, and the 
complication of class-action procedure raise the barriers high.  The 
Federal Judicial Center has created illustrative clear-notice forms that 
provide a helpful starting point for actions similar to those described 
in the forms. 
Id. 
130 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (holding that due process 
required a right to be heard); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979) 
(stating that there is a constitutional right to notice and to an opportunity to be heard). 
131 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B). 
132 See, e.g., Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee:  1966 Amendments of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 392 (1967) (interpreting former Rule 
23(c)(2)(C)). 
133 Woolley, supra note 103, at 580, 604 (noting that the successful intervenor does not 
have to be bound by the decisions the representative makes and should be treated as a full 
party).  If a timely motion to intervene is made, an absent class member will have the right 
to intervene under Rule 24(a) if he can show inadequate representation.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 
24(a).  Additionally, there can be permissive intervention under Rule 24(b) even if the 
representation is adequate.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b).  It has been argued that there should 
be an absolute right to intervene in class actions.  See Woolley, supra note 103, at 607 
(arguing that there should only be an exception for manageability, such as if far too many 
people intervene); Sherman L. Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 
1204, 1223-24 (1966) (stating there should be a right to intervention, but that courts can limit 
the activities of intervenors).  Although some argue this will lead to manageability 
problems, it is unlikely that too many people would seek to intervene.  Woolley, supra note 
103, at 608 (arguing that there would be substantial attorney’s fees, and that even if there is 
a contingent fee arrangement available, fees generally will not be recoverable by the 
intervenor because he must contribute substantially to the litigation to share in the fees).  In 
fact, in one study of four federal district courts, there were attempts to intervene in only 
11%, 9%, 5%, and 0% of the cases in each district.  Willging, supra note 1, at 140.  Allowing a 
right to intervene in class actions would strengthen the watchdog effect intervenors have 
on the class representation, decreasing protection for the absent class members.  See id. 
134 See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812. 
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However, there is a competing doctrine that treats absent class members 
as parties for certain procedural purposes, sometimes even in the 
absence of the required due process protections.135  The Seventh Circuit 
in Bridgestone/Firestone used this doctrine to justify gaining power over 
putative class members without offering notice or an opportunity to be 
heard.136 
C. Treating Absent Class Members as Parties to Procedural Events 
Absent class members are sometimes treated as parties for 
procedural events, but it can be difficult to determine when this is 
proper.137  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not formally define 
“party.”138  Nevertheless, Rule 23 envisions active participation in the 
class action proceedings for party status to attach.139  For example, courts 
have held that absent class members were not parties for the purpose of 
                                                 
135 See infra Part II.C. 
136 See infra Part III.B. 
137 See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 9-10 (2002).  Absent class members may be 
considered parties or nonparties based on the situation and the judge’s opinion of the 
status of absent class members.  HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBERT CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS 
ACTIONS § 16.01, 16.02 (3d ed. 1992).  Putative class members have been notoriously 
difficult for courts to categorize, and there have been many labels attached to this group.  
Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 343 n.3 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring); cf. 
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940) (absent parties); Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. 
Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 366 (1921) (interested parties).  They may also be considered parties 
while analyzing the status of the case before certification.  Roper, 445 U.S. at 343 n.3 
(Stevens, J., concurring). 
138 Ian Gallacher, Representative Litigation in Maryland:  The Past, Present, and Future of the 
Class Action Rule in State Court, 58 MD. L. REV. 1510, 1545 (1999).  If the Rules are looked at 
in conjunction, a “party” appears to be “one who has sued or is being sued in current 
litigation, or one who has intervened in the action, and is therefore an active, not passive, 
litigant.”  Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 11, 17(a)). 
139 Id.  However, some courts have used Rule 23(d) to require affirmative action on the 
part of absent class members in order to reap the benefits of class membership.  NEWBERG 
& CONTE, supra note 137, § 16.01, 16.02.  In Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., the State of 
Iowa, on behalf of all its subdivisions, sued an asphalt manufacturer.  281 F. Supp. 391, 400-
01 (S.D. Iowa 1968).  The court stated that Rule 23(c)(2) did not prevent, and that Rule 
23(d)(2) allowed for, the class notice to require absent class members to indicate if they 
intended to submit damage claims in order to be a part of the class, essentially creating an 
opt in class.  Id. at 403-04.  In Harris v. Jones, the court stated that within a reasonable time 
after determining who opted out after the first notice, another notice should be given to the 
absent class members “requiring them to file simple statements of their claims . . . with 
reference to the types and sources of representation, if any, upon which they relied in 
purchasing their securities and the time they first learned any representations were false.”  
41 F.R.D. 70, 74 (D. Utah 1966).  If this information was not submitted, the action could be 
dismissed with prejudice.  Id. at 74-75.  This information would allow the court to better 
assess the adequacy of the class representatives and the potential effectiveness of 
subclasses.  Id. 
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gaining the consent required to have a case transferred to a magistrate.140  
Despite this holding, intervention by absent class members, which is 
certainly active participation that gives class members party status, does 
not violate the complete diversity rule because only named class 
members are considered parties for determining whether there is 
complete diversity.141 
The Supreme Court in Devlin v. Scardelletti142 stated that the status of 
absent class members as parties or non-parties should be determined 
based on the context of the procedural rule in which the question 
arises.143  The decision must be made by looking at the “goals of class 
action litigation,” especially judicial economy and efficiency of 
administration.144  In Devlin, after the district court preliminarily certified 
a settlement class in a Rule 23(b)(1) class action, an absent class member 
failed to timely intervene and instead objected at the settlement fairness 
                                                 
140 Williams v. Gen. Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 159 F.3d 266, 269 (7th Cir. 1998).  The 
question raised by this case was whether unnamed class members needed to consent to 
having the case transferred to a federal magistrate judge in order to be bound to the 
magistrate’s decision.  Id.  The court held that the absent class members were not parties for 
this purpose because requiring their consent would virtually eliminate cases being referred 
to magistrates in class actions, essentially creating opt-in classes.  Id.  The court went on to 
reason that if absent class members “are more accurately regarded as having something 
less than full party status, the need for their express consent also changes.”  Id.  If an absent 
class member wants to contest the cause being given to a magistrate, he can intervene 
under Rule 24(a), which would make him a party, and then he could refuse to consent to 
the transfer.  Id.  The absent class member could also make a collateral challenge to the 
adequacy of representation based on the representative’s decision to consent to transferring 
the case to the magistrate.  Id. (noting that in both intervention and collateral attacks, there 
would need to be a showing of inadequate representation). 
141 Cauble, 255 U.S. at 363, 366-67.  This rule allowing for the consideration of only named 
class members when deciding if there is complete diversity is appropriate because to hold 
otherwise would have the effect of invalidating most multistate classes in federal court.  
Devlin, 536 U.S. at 9-10.  In Stewart v. Dunham, class plaintiffs were allowed to intervene 
after removal of the case, and they destroyed complete diversity.  115 U. S. 61, 64 (1885). 
142 536 U.S. 1. 
143 Id. at 9-10.  “The label ‘party’ does not indicate an absolute characteristic, but rather a 
conclusion about the applicability of various procedural rules that may differ based on 
context.”  Id.  However, the dissent in Devlin and some commentators have noted the 
uncertainty that has been created by this reasoning.  Id. at 19-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“Today’s opinion . . . abandons the bright-line rule that only those persons named as such 
are parties to a judgment, in favor of a vague inquiry ‘based on context.’”); see Federal 
Jurisdiction and Procedure, 116 HARV. L. REV. 332, 332 (2002) (criticizing this decision for 
creating too much uncertainty). 
144 Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, supra note 143, at 339 (quoting Devlin, 536, U.S. at 10).  
The Court’s interpretation of the term “party” created uncertainty about whether an absent 
class member may be considered a party for other events in class action litigation.  Id. at 
336. 
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hearing.145  The district court overruled his objection and did not allow 
him to appeal.146  The Supreme Court later held that any absent class 
member objecting to a proposed settlement at the fairness hearing is 
treated as a party and can appeal without formally intervening.147  
However, the issues that can be raised on appeal are limited to those 
objected to at the fairness hearing.148  The dissent noted that “[n]ot even 
petitioner . . . [was] willing to advance the novel and surely erroneous 
argument that a nonnamed class member is a party to the class-action 
litigation before the class is certified.”149 
In determining whether the objector should be given party status, 
the Court focused on two factors.150  One was whether his interests 
diverged from the class representative, which would be evidenced by his 
objection at the settlement fairness hearing.151  The other was the binding 
effect of the judgment on the objector.152  The objector in Devlin was not 
given the opportunity to opt out of the class because it was certified 
under Rule 23(b)(1).153  The extension of the Devlin reasoning to Rule 
23(b)(3) class actions has been questioned because there is another 
remedy available to potential objectors—opting out of the case.154  In fact, 
                                                 
145 Devlin, 536 U.S. at 5-6; cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(4)(A) (“Any class member may object to 
a proposed settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise that requires court approval.”).  
Several courts have found participation in the fairness hearing to be a due process 
requirement.  See, e.g., Petrovic v. Amoco Oil Co., 200 F.3d 1140, 1153 (8th Cir. 1999). 
146 Devlin, 536 U.S. at 3-4. 
147 Id.  Generally, only parties to a suit can appeal an adverse judgment.  Marino v. Ortiz, 
484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988).  Previously, some courts held that absent class members had no 
right to appeal without formally intervening.  See In re Navigant Consulting, Inc., Sec. 
Litig., 275 F.3d 616, 619 (7th Cir. 2001) (arguing that because the absent class members were 
not considered parties for determining complete diversity, they cannot be treated as parties 
for the purpose of having a right to appeal); In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust 
Litig., 115 F.3d 456, 457 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that absent class members can only gain 
power to appeal by intervening); Guthrie v. Evans, 815 F.2d 626, 629 (11th Cir. 1987) 
(arguing that if absent class members were given a right to appeal it would inhibit the 
manageability of the litigation, which is one of the primary goals of class actions). 
148 Devlin, 536 U.S. at 10. 
149 Id. at 16 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
150 Id. at 10. 
151 Id. at 9.  The dissent stated that under the Restatement’s reasoning, the objector was 
not a party but was bound by the judgment as though he were.  Id. at 19-20 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
152 Id. at 10. 
153 Id. 
154 See In re Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co. Sales Practices Litig., 302 F.3d 799, 800 (8th Cir. 2002) 
(“Because the Court relied upon the mandatory character of the class action, we question 
whether the Devlin’s holding applies to opt out class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(3)”); 
Thompson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 216 F.R.D. 55, 69-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“The scope of Devlin 
remains uncertain at this time.”).  Although one could argue that because absent class 
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the Arkansas Supreme Court expressly refused to extend Devlin to an 
opt-out class action, although its decision was based on state certification 
law rather than on Federal Rule 23.155 
Absent class members are also treated as parties for the purpose of 
tolling the statute of limitations.156  This tolling rule allows the statute of 
limitations on each class member’s individual claims to be tolled from 
the time a class suit is filed until certification is denied.157  The Supreme 
Court has never answered the question of whether this tolling rule 
applies if a putative class member in the first action attempts to become a 
class representative in a subsequent action.158  Additionally, most courts 
have not allowed tolling when the potential class plaintiffs have 
previously been denied certification and then attempt to “stack” one 
class action onto another in order to relitigate the certification question in 
different courts.159 
Treating class members as parties for procedural events is a very 
limited way to gain power over absent class members.160  Thus, in the 
                                                                                                             
members in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions have the opportunity to opt out, they are not truly 
bound by the decision; the Devlin Court drew no such distinction.  Federal Jurisdiction and 
Procedure, supra note 143, at 344 n.48.  In fact, it may be good policy to allow appeals in opt 
out class cases because it would reduce the incentive to opt out and further the class action 
goal of concentrated litigation.  Id.; see infra Part IV.B.3 for a discussion of how this 
reasoning is not appropriately extended to class certification proceedings. 
155 Ballard v. Advanced Am. Cash Advance Ctr. of Ark., 79 S.W.3d 835, 837 (Ark. 2002).  
The Arkansas court attempted to distinguish the case from Devlin by stating that there were 
differences in the Arkansas class action rule, the opportunity to opt out was present, and 
Arkansas case law required the absent class member to intervene before he could appeal.  
Id.  It has been argued that the only significant difference between the two decision was the 
ability of the objector in Ballard to opt out of the case.  Chip Leibovich, Civil Procedure, 25 U. 
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 887, 891 (2003) (noting that the rules of procedure that governed 
class actions in the two cases were nearly identical and that the absent class members in 
both cases moved to intervene at virtually the same time).  This difference is significant, 
though, in the sense that the Devlin decision gave much weight to the fact that the appeal 
was the petitioner’s only protection from being bound by the settlement.  Id. at 892. 
156 Ballard, 79 S.W.3d at 553. 
157 Id.; see Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 353-54 (1983) (holding that the 
tolling rule applied to putative class members that brought individual actions after the 
class certification was denied). 
158 Vinson v. Seven Seventeen HB Phil. Corp., No. Civ. A00-6334, 2001 WL 1774073 at *6 
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2001). 
159 Id.; see, e.g., Andrews v. Orr, 851 F.2d 146, 149 (6th Cir. 1988) (stating that tolling rule 
only applies if the subsequent action is separate, not for similar class claims); Robbin v. 
Fluor Corp., 835 F.2d 213, 214 (9th Cir. 1987); Korwek v. Hunt, 827 F.2d 874, 879 (2d Cir. 
1987); Salazar-Calderon v. Presidio Valley Farmers Ass’n, 765 F.2d 1334, 1351 (5th Cir. 
1985). 
160 See supra notes 137-49. 
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context of Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, courts generally must provide 
notice, an opportunity to be heard, and the right to opt out in order to 
gain power over absent class members.161  A trickier question arises 
when courts attempt to gain power over putative class members in order 
to bind them to the class certification decision.162  There is currently a 
split of authority over whether this power is proper and what due 
process requires to make this exercise of power constitutional.163 
III.  THE CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING WHETHER THERE IS 
CONSTITUTIONAL POWER TO BIND PUTATIVE CLASS MEMBERS WHEN CLASS 
CERTIFICATION IS DENIED 
Only two federal circuit courts have ruled on the constitutionality of 
exercising power over putative class members after class certification is 
denied in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action.164  The Third Circuit in GM Trucks 
II held that such power was not present because a chance to opt out was 
not given, and thus, there was no way to infer consent from the putative 
class members.165  Additionally, the court stated that putative class 
members were not parties for the procedural event of class 
certification.166  On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit recently held in 
Bridgestone/Firestone that there was power to bind putative class members 
to a certification denial if they were adequately represented.167  The court 
buttressed this holding by finding that putative class members are 
parties for class certification.168  In the court’s opinion, it had power 
under the All Writs Act169 to enjoin the entire putative class and their 
                                                 
161 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985); see supra Part II.B.2. 
162 See generally infra Part III. 
163 See infra Part III. 
164 Compare GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d 133, 141 (3d Cir. 1998), with Bridgestone/Firestone, 
333 F.3d 763, 768-69 (7th Cir. 2003). 
165 GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d at 141. 
166 Id. 
167 Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 769. 
168 Id. 
169 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000).  Federal courts have power under the All Writs Act to 
“issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and 
agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”  Id.; see In re Paine Webber Ltd. P’ship Litig., 
No. 94 Civ. 8547SHS, 1996 WL 374162 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 1996) (granting an injunction 
against class members from filing actions in state court during the federal settlement 
approval process).  See generally Joan Steinman, Managing Punitive Damages: A Role for 
Mandatory “Limited Generosity” Classes and Anti-Suit Injunctions?, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
1043, 1105-06 (2001) (discussing the applicability of the Act generally). 
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attorneys from attempting to certify the same nationwide class in 
another forum.170 
A. The Third Circuit Holds There Is No Power over the Putative Class 
In 1998, the Third Circuit decided GM Trucks II, a case involving a 
claim for damages stemming from General Motor’s manufacture of an 
allegedly defective gas tank on a certain model of pickup truck.171  Many 
federal actions were filed in different jurisdictions, but they were all 
transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for discovery and pre-
trial proceedings pursuant to the Multi-District Litigation statute.172  
When the parties had reached a settlement agreement, the district court 
preliminarily approved it and certified the class under Rule 23(b)(3).173  
After notice of the proposed settlement was given to the class, the district 
court gave final approval to the settlement.174  The defendant appealed, 
and the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the requirements of Rule 23 
were not met by this class.175 
During the federal court proceedings, the same parties were engaged 
in a parallel class action in a Louisiana state court.176  The state court 
preliminarily certified the same class, approved the same settlement, and 
ordered individual notice be sent to the class members.177  Several class 
members that were absent from the federal action moved the federal 
court for intervention and for an injunction against the Louisiana state 
court proceedings.178  However, the district court denied the motion to 
intervene and also refused to grant the injunction, forcing the parties to 
appeal.179  While the appeal was in progress, the Louisiana court entered 
final judgment and approved the settlement.180 
                                                 
170 Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 769. 
171 GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d at 138. 
172 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000)).  If there are multiple class actions in federal court, 
there is power under the Multi-District Litigation statute to consolidate them for the 
purpose of pre-trial procedures, which would include class certification.  Brian D. Boyle, 
Parallel State and Federal Court Class Actions, 31 THE BRIEF 32, 34 (2002). 
173 GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d at 138 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)). 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 139. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. (noting that the class certified in state court contained both named and absent 
parties from the federal action). 
178 Id. at 140. 
179 Id.  The Third Circuit stated that it was proper to deny the motion to intervene 
because it was made four months after the claim was filed and two months after the 
proposed settlement was presented without a showing of good cause except an attempt to 
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The Third Circuit held that it did not have power to bind the 5.7 
million people in the Louisiana class in order to enjoin the Louisiana 
proceedings.181  Absent personal jurisdiction over the putative class 
members, the due process protections mandated by Shutts would need to 
be given.182  However, since there was no class pending, no right to opt 
out had been given, and thus there was no way to infer consent from the 
putative class members.183  In other words, because the members of the 
Louisiana settlement class were not parties to the Third Circuit’s 
proceedings, there was no way to infer consent, and they did not have 
minimum contacts with the forum state; as a result there were no 
grounds to bind them to the class certification decision and enjoin them 
from repeated certification attempts.184 
In dicta, the Third Circuit stated that enjoining the named parties, 
even those who have minimum contacts with the forum state, may be 
appropriate.185  However, such an injunction would be of little value 
                                                                                                             
argue that there was no reason to intervene until the class representatives attempted to 
certify the class in the Louisiana court.  Id. at 140 n.1. 
180 Id. at 140. 
181 Id. at 141.  The court also held that it could not enjoin the Louisiana class members 
because the Louisiana court had entered a final judgment, and review was barred by the 
Full Faith and Credit Act and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  Id. at 141-43 (citing 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738 (2000); Blake v. Papadakos, 953 F.2d 68, 71 (3d Cir. 1992)). 
182 GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d at 141; see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 
(1985). 
183 GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d at 141. 
184 Id.; see Joan Steinman, The Newest Frontier of Judicial Activism: Removal Under the All 
Writs Act, 80 B.U. L. REV. 773, 862 (2000) (stating that in the absence of traditional personal 
jurisdiction or conduct in the litigation sufficient to infer consent, there would be no power 
over absent class members to enjoin them from attempting to certify the class in parallel 
state litigation). 
185 GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d at 141 n.2. 
We note that enjoining the few Louisiana class members that the MDL 
court does have personal jurisdiction over  . . . would serve no 
purpose. Barring the other procedural barriers discussed infra, it is 
conceivable that we could direct the district court to enjoin those 200 
plaintiffs from pursuing their state damage remedies in Louisiana. As 
the district court properly pointed out, however, since the appellants’ 
stated goal here is to prevent the Louisiana court from further 
consideration of the settlement in toto, little would be accomplished by 
enjoining only those 200 plaintiffs  . . . and we have not been asked to 
do so.  At all events, the limited injunction would not halt the 
Louisiana proceedings because the original Louisiana plaintiffs (over 
whom we have no jurisdiction) could simply continue with the 
settlement. 
Id.; see Monaghan, supra note 96, at 1185 n.171 (arguing that the GM Trucks II court refused 
to consider that it had power to enjoin the class representatives in the Louisiana state court 
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because any absent class member without minimum contacts could 
certify the class in another forum.186  The defendant could not even argue 
collateral estoppel against these absent class members because they did 
not have a chance to litigate the issue in the original proceeding.187  Other 
courts have noted that there may be power over absent class members if 
there is a separate basis for personal jurisdiction over them and notice is 
given.188 
The Third Circuit also held that the Anti-Injunction Act prevented 
enjoining the putative class members in this case because the state court 
proceedings had already begun.189  The Anti-Injunction Act bars a 
federal district court from enjoining pending state court litigation unless 
“expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of 
[the federal court’s] jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its 
judgments.”190  The third exception, commonly referred to as the 
relitigation exception, is based on the concepts of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel.191  Some courts, including the Third Circuit in GM 
Trucks II, have held that a class certification decision is not a final 
judgment that satisfies the relitigation exception.192 
Consequently, the Third Circuit refused to enjoin the Louisiana class 
members, in part, because it lacked power to do so and because the Anti-
Injunction Act prevented interference with the ongoing state litigation.193  
                                                                                                             
class action because they joined in the federal action and because they had common legal 
representation with the federal class action representatives). 
186 GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d at 141. 
187 See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330 (1979). 
188 See In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig., 48 F. Supp. 2d 699, 705 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (noting that 
dicta in GM Trucks II provides that the federal court can enjoin parties over which it has 
personal jurisdiction from bringing parallel litigation in state courts); see also Hillman v. 
Webley, 115 F.3d 1461, 1469 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating that the district court had power 
“under the All Writs Act to enjoin parties before it from pursuing conflicting litigation in 
the state court, but unfortunately it did not pursue that route”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class 
Actions: Interjurisdictional Warfare, 218 N.Y. L.J. 5, 35 (1997) (noting that federal district 
courts have power to enjoin the parties before them, including enjoining defendants from 
settling with other class plaintiffs in another court). 
189 GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d at 144. 
190 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000); see Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 
281, 286 (1970). 
191 See Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 147 (1988). 
192 See GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d at 146; J.R. Clearwater Inc. v. Ashland Chem. Co., 93 F.3d 
176, 179 (5th Cir. 1996).  However, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Bridgestone/Firestone 
created a circuit split on this issue.  See infra notes 216-18 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the Seventh Circuit’s analysis of the Anti-Injunction Act. 
193 GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d at 146. 
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This view remained unchallenged until the Seventh Circuit’s decision in 
Bridgestone/Firestone in June 2003.194 
B. The Seventh Circuit Holds That There Is Power over the Putative Class if It 
Is Adequately Represented 
In Bridgestone/Firestone, the Seventh Circuit held that there was 
constitutional power to bind putative class members of an alleged Rule 
23(b)(3) class to a class certification denial if they were adequately 
represented.195  Once it established it had power over the putative class, 
the court used its power under the All Writs Act to enjoin the class 
members from attempting to certify the same nationwide class in a 
different forum.196 
The plaintiffs in this case were consumers of recalled Ford vehicles 
and Firestone tires.197  The district court originally granted their motion 
to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3).198  However, the Seventh Circuit 
decertified the class on appeal because choice of law problems prevented 
the class from meeting the predominance requirement.199  The named 
plaintiffs, and also some absent class members, then attempted to have 
                                                 
194 333 F.3d 763, 765 (7th Cir. 2003). 
195 Id. at 769.  Although not in the context of class actions, a Texas federal court used the 
reasoning of Bridgestone/Firestone to buttress its argument that an injunction was proper to 
prevent the filing of a suit by the parties and privies of the original suit so as to uphold the 
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.  Dow Agrosciences v. Bates, No. Civ.A. 
5:01-CV-331-C, 2003 WL 22660741, at *20 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 14, 2003).  The plaintiffs had 
“intentionally stacked the deck against [the defendant] by simultaneous pursuit of so many 
different parallel state court actions.”  Id.  “The law cannot tolerate the risk that even one 
state court might carve out some exception to res judicata and collateral estoppel and allow 
the action before it to proceed.”  Id. 
196 Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 765 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000) (the All Writs 
Act)).  Parallel cases were pending in state courts, so the Seventh Circuit held that denials 
of class certification fall within the relitigation exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, which 
bars federal courts from enjoining pending state court proceedings.  Id. at 766; see 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2283 (2000); see also supra notes 189-94 and accompanying text discussing the Third 
Circuit’s analysis.  However, recently, a Texas state court has certified a settlement class of 
the same character as the one denied by the Seventh Circuit.  See Shields v. 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.,  No. B-170, 462, 2004 WL 546883, at *43 (Tex. Dist. Mar. 12, 
2004).   That court held that because it was a settlement class, the problems of commonality 
and manageability that had derailed the certification process in the federal court were not 
at issue.  Id.  Thus, the court distinguished its decision from the Seventh Circuit’s based on 
the notion that the Seventh Circuit had left the door open for settlement classes to be 
certified in this action.  Id. 
197 In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Products Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012, 1015 (7th 
Cir. 2002). 
198 Id. at 1017. 
199 Id. 
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the same nationwide class certified in several other jurisdictions.200  In 
reaction to these repeated certification attempts, the defendants moved 
the federal court for an injunction barring the entire putative class and 
class counsel from attempting to certify a class with the same or 
substantially similar characteristics in any other jurisdiction.201  The trial 
court denied the motion, but the Seventh Circuit reversed and granted 
the injunction.202 
Mainly, the court granted the injunction to prevent putative class 
members from repeatedly attempting to certify the same class it had 
already held was untenable.203  The court envisioned a situation in which 
nine judges refuse to certify a class, but a tenth judge certifies it, 
rendering each of the previous nine decisions meaningless.204  The court 
also discussed how the probability that a class will be certified increases 
as the number of certification attempts increases.205  It concluded that 
even if only one judge in ten would certify a particular class and an 
attempt for certification were made in ten different states, there would be 
a sixty-five percent chance of class certification, with the percent 
increasing to eighty-eight if the attempt were made in twenty states.206 
In what appeared to be an attempt to take the case out of the 
purview of Shutts, the Bridgestone/Firestone plaintiffs argued that the 
putative class members could not be bound by the decision because the 
federal court did not have the power to issue nationwide service of 
process in class actions.207  However, the court stated that this rule is 
qualified by the fact that a federal court can issue nationwide service of 
process if there is a federal law relied on in the complaint that authorizes 
such service.208  In this case, the plaintiff relied on the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), which does 
                                                 
200 Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 765; see Shields, 2004 WL 546883, at *25 (noting that in 
addition to the certification attempt in this Texas court, putative class action lawsuits were 
filed in various states, including Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, and 
Wisconsin). 
201 Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 765.  
202 Id. at 766. 
203 Id. at 767. 
204 Id. at 766-67. 
205 Id. at 767. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. at 768. 
208 Id. 
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authorize nationwide service.209  Nevertheless, service was not given to 
the putative class members, making the point merely dicta.210 
The court then declared that because absent class members have 
been treated as parties for many procedural events, they should be 
treated as parties for the purpose of class certification.211  The court then 
attempted to analogize this case to Devlin, in which the Supreme Court 
had allowed absent class members to appeal a judgment, even though 
they did not intervene, because they had objected at a settlement fairness 
hearing.212  The Seventh Circuit stated that because the putative class 
members could have sought certiorari after its decision, they were 
parties and were bound by the decision as long as they were adequately 
represented, an issue which was not contested in this case.213  The reason 
the Seventh Circuit attempted to analogize Bridgestone/Firestone to Devlin 
was to support its decision to bind the putative class members without 
giving them notice and an opportunity to be heard.214  Finally, the court 
rejected the contention that putative class members have a right to opt 
out because the purpose of that protection is to allow class members to 
proceed with individual actions, a right they still have after class 
certification is denied.215 
                                                 
209 Id.  The Seventh Circuit stated in dicta that one of the underlying claims was based on 
RICO, which authorizes nationwide service of process even over those who were not 
defendants.  Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1965 (b) (2000)).  Congressional grant allowing for 
nationwide service of process may be one way to get jurisdiction over putative class 
members after the denial of class certification in federal court.  See Miller & Crump, supra 
note 82, at 30 (citing United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S. 569, 603-04 (1878)) (stating 
that nothing in the Constitution prevents Congress from passing laws giving federal 
district courts the power to issue nationwide service of process).  Rule 4 generally sets the 
limit on the jurisdictional reach of federal district courts.  FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A).  
However, there is an exception when there is a congressional enactment authorizing 
nationwide service of process.  FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(D).  This enactment would create the 
potential for personal jurisdiction over the putative class members, eliminating the need to 
rely on the Shutts doctrine because there would be no need to imply consent.  See supra Part 
II.B.2 for a discussion of the Shutts doctrine. 
210 See Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 768. 
211 Id. (citing Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985)). 
212 Id. (citing Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1 (2002)); see infra Part IV.B.3, which argues 
that class certification proceedings are not sufficiently analogous to any instance in which 
absent class members have been treated as parties to justify binding them to a denial of 
class certification in the absence of notice and an opportunity to be heard; see also supra 
notes 142-55 and accompanying text discussing the Devlin decision. 
213 Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 768-69. 
214 See id.  For a discussion of how this reasoning is flawed, see infra Part IV.B.3. 
215 Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 769.  The court noted: 
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The Bridgestone/Firestone court also created a circuit split by holding 
that this situation fits within the relitigation exception to the Anti-
Injunction Act.216  The court stated that a final judgment, for the purpose 
of collateral estoppel, need only be an adjudication of an issue that is 
“sufficiently firm.”217  The decision to deny the certification of a 
nationwide class was then considered sufficiently firm for the purpose of 
fitting within the exception because it received full attention in both the 
district court and appellate court, and certiorari was sought.218 
The reasoning employed by the Seventh Circuit differs sharply from 
that of the Third Circuit.219  Although there are advantages to both lines 
of thinking, neither creates an efficient class certification system while 
affording putative class members due process.220  As will be shown in 
Part IV, enjoining the putative class is an appropriate way to deal with 
the problems associated with repeated certification attempts, but due 
process requires that the putative class members be afforded notice, an 
opportunity to be heard, and adequate representation.221 
IV.  CREATING AN EFFICIENT CLASS CERTIFICATION SYSTEM WHILE 
AFFORDING DUE PROCESS 
The Third Circuit was rigid in its adherence to Shutts when it 
required that there be a right to opt out in order to gain power over 
putative class members.222  The court ruled that because no class was 
pending, there would be no chance to opt out and no way for the court 
to infer consent.223  Further, it declared that the putative class members 
could not be considered parties to the action because they were not 
                                                                                                             
[N]o statute or Rule requires notice, and an opportunity to opt out, 
before the certification decision is made; it is a post-certification step.  
No one is entitled to opt out of the certification, a decision necessarily 
made on a classwide, all-or-none basis; one opts out of a certified class.  
And a person who opts out receives the right to go it alone, not to 
launch a competing class action. 
Id.; see Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat’l Elec. Contractors Ass’n, Inc., 814 F.2d 358, 363-67 
(7th Cir. 1987). 
216 Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 767 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 
§ 13 (1980)). 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 Compare GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d 133, 141 (3d Cir. 1998), with Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 
F.3d at 766-67. 
220 See infra Part IV.A-B. 
221 See infra Part IV.B. 
222 GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d at 141. 
223 Id. 
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before the court.224  Therefore, the court held that there was no basis for 
power over the putative class in order to bind them to the class 
certification decision and enjoin them from repeated certification 
attempts.225 
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit melded two doctrines 
together to find constitutional power to bind the putative class.226  The 
court held that due process required only adequate representation in 
order for there to be power over the putative class members.227  It 
buttressed this reasoning by stating that absent class members were 
considered parties for the purpose of class certification.228  Although 
effective in eliminating repeated certification attempts, this holding did 
not offer appropriate due process protection to putative class 
members.229 
This Part will first discuss the problems surrounding class 
certification in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions.230  It will then delineate how 
neither the approach taken by the Third Circuit nor the Seventh Circuit 
has adequately addressed these problems while affording due process.231  
Indeed, this Part will show that in order to gain constitutional power to 
bind putative class members, there must be pre-certification notice, an 
opportunity to be heard, and adequate representation.232  Finally, this 
Part will demonstrate how it is inappropriate to analogize the class 
certification process to other procedural events for which absent class 
members were treated as parties in order to justify failing to give notice 
to the putative class.233 
A. The Problems Associated with Numerous Certification Attempts 
Although multistate Rule 23(b)(3) class actions are essential to an 
efficient judicial system, they create many problems at the certification 
                                                 
224 Id. 
225 Id. 
226 Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d 763, 768-69 (7th Cir. 2003). 
227 Id. at 769 (“Holding the absent class members to the outcome is no more an exercise in 
virtual representation than it is to hold them to a decision on the merits.”). 
228 Id. at 768. 
229 See infra Part IV.B.2. 
230 See infra Part IV.A. 
231 See infra Part IV.B. 
232 See infra Part IV.B.2. 
233 See infra Part IV.B.3. 
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stage.234  The most striking is that putative class members that are not 
present in an original federal proceeding in which certification is denied 
can attempt to certify the class in another jurisdiction.235  The defendant 
cannot argue collateral estoppel against these absent class members 
because the members would never have a chance to litigate the 
certification issue in the first proceeding.236  Consequently, there can be 
as many attempts to certify the same class under Rule 23(b)(3) as there 
are willing plaintiffs and proper forums.237  By allowing potential class 
representatives endless “bites at the apple,” the probability that classes 
will be certified increases greatly.238  The Seventh Circuit envisioned nine 
out of ten judges denying class certification, with the tenth judge 
rendering the other nine decisions meaningless.239 
Repeated attempts to certify Rule 23(b)(3) classes also waste the 
resources of defendants by forcing them to spend money on attorney’s 
fees and costs for litigating the same issue repeatedly.240  Finality is 
mythical in such a system, and the decisions of federal courts are often 
                                                 
234 See, e.g., Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 679 P.2d 1159, 1165 (Kan. 1984).  Although 
some have argued against multistate class actions generally, these actions allow for an 
economical use of judicial resources.  Id.  Further, it can be problematic to find plaintiffs 
willing to bring statewide actions in all appropriate states before the statute of limitations 
period has ended.  Id. 
235 See GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d 133, 141 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding no power to bind the 
putative class members to the federal court’s declaration that the class was untenable, thus 
allowing for attempts to certify the same class in any state court with proper jurisdiction); 
In re Glenn W. Turner Enters. Litig., 521 F.2d 775, 781 (3d Cir. 1975) (stating that there is 
nothing in Rule 23 that prevents the relitigation of the class certification issue in another 
forum). 
236 See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330 (1979).  However, if it is the same 
plaintiff in both actions, then collateral estoppel may be pled.  See id.  However, there still 
would be the inconvenience and expense of having to go to multiple courts to litigate. 
237 See Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d 763, 766 (7th Cir. 2003). 
238 Id. 
239 Id. at 767 
Even if just one judge in ten believes that a nationwide class is lawful, 
then if the plaintiffs file in ten different states the probability that at 
least one will certify a nationwide class is 65% (0.910 = 0.349). Filing in 
20 states produces an 88% probability of national class certification 
(0.920 = 0.122). 
Id. 
240 Boyle, supra note 172, at 38.  It may be fair to require these defendants to litigate in 
multiple courts because there would be traditional personal jurisdiction over the 
defendants in each forum so as not to “offend traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken 
v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
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rendered meaningless.241  Plaintiffs are able to coerce settlements from 
defendants, even in the presence of only weak claims, because 
defendants fear that a class will be certified given enough attempts.242 
Although eliminating multiple attempts to certify Rule 23(b)(3) 
classes would put the fate of an entire class into the hands of a single 
judge, that is the basis for our legal system—a single judge decides a case 
and the parties have a chance to appeal.243  The Seventh Circuit believed 
that one federal judge was competent to decide whether a class was 
tenable.244  It also believed that allowing only one certification attempt in 
Rule 23(b)(3) actions would still provide an opportunity for full litigation 
of the issue, which was assured by the chance to appeal a denial of 
certification all the way to the Supreme Court.245 
The Seventh Circuit attempted to streamline the certification process 
when it used its power under the All Writs Act to enjoin the putative 
class members and their attorneys from attempting to certify the same 
class it found untenable in a different forum.246  However, in doing so 
the Seventh Circuit did not afford due process.247 
B. Creating a More Effective Class Certification System While Affording Due 
Process 
The Third Circuit failed to address the problems related to multiple 
certification attempts due in part to its rigid application of the Shutts 
implied consent doctrine.248  Later, the Seventh Circuit exercised power 
                                                 
241 This Note argues in Part IV.B.2 and Part V that giving notice and the opportunity to 
be heard to putative class members during the certification process would increase the 
effectiveness with which such proceedings are conducted. 
242 See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299-1300 (7th Cir. 1995).  Judge 
Posner states that the threat of class certification can act as blackmail, causing defendants to 
settle.  Id.  It has also been noted that the amendment to Rule 23, creating a right to appeal 
class certification decisions was due in part to concern over this excessive pressure.  
Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”:  Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1357, 1358 (2003).  However, there is also evidence that settlements in class actions are 
generally “below even the level of compensatory damages alleged by the plaintiffs.”  John 
C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General:  Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty 
Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 225-26 (1983). 
243 Rule 23 now allows the federal appeals courts to grant an interlocutory appeal of a 
class certification decision.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (enacted in 1998, the year the Third Circuit 
decided GM Trucks II); see supra Part III.A for a discussion of the Third Circuit’s opinion. 
244 See Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 768-69. 
245 See id. 
246 See id. at 769. 
247 See infra Part IV.B.2. 
248 See GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d 133, 141 (3d Cir. 1998); see also infra Part IV.B.1. 
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over a putative class in an attempt to provide a more workable class 
certification format.249  In doing so, it based its power over the putative 
class members on a combination of the two following doctrines:  the 
requirement of adequate representation and treating absent class 
members as parties for procedural events.250  This reasoning was 
inappropriate because notice, an opportunity to be heard, and adequate 
representation must be present in order to gain constitutional power to 
bind putative class members.251 
1. Setting the Bar Too High—The Right to Opt Out Should Not Be 
Required 
Clearly, in the absence of minimum contacts with the forum state, 
there is no traditional personal jurisdiction over putative class members 
such that binding them to the class certification decision would be 
consistent with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.”252  However, the Shutts Court held that absent members of 
certified classes can be bound to a decision in the absence of minimum 
contacts.253  By affording the opportunity to opt out of a class, a 
protection that was first given to absent class members in federal courts 
in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions pursuant to Rule 23(c)(2),254 the Shutts Court 
was able to infer the consent of the absent classmembers to be bound by 
the judgment.255 
The Third Circuit held that because the putative class members were 
not parties to the proceedings, their consent must be inferred in order for 
a court to have power to bind them to the certification decision.256  This 
consent, in the absence of a voluntary appearance in court, could only be 
inferred from the refusal to opt out of the class after notice and the 
                                                 
249 See Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 765-69. 
250 See infra Part IV.B.2-3. 
251 See infra Part IV.B.2. 
252 See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)); see also supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text for a brief 
discussion of the decisions that have shaped the minimum contacts test. 
253 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 (1985). 
254 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2).  For a discussion of the provisions and recent Amendment of 
Rule 23, see supra Part II.B.1. 
255 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812; see Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779-81 (1984) 
(noting that anyone can consent to jurisdiction in any forum). 
256 GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d 133, 141 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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chance to opt out had been given.257  However, in so holding, the court 
misinterpreted the rationale behind inferring consent.258 
This Note is not suggesting that the Supreme Court rethink its 
implied consent doctrine.  After certification, consent must be inferred; 
thus, a right to opt out must be given.259  However, Shutts required 
consent because it was depriving the absent class members of their 
“chose in action,” which is a constitutionally protected property right.260  
When a motion for class certification is denied, the putative class 
members still have the right to bring an individual action. 261  Although 
one could argue that the ability to be a class representative is analogous 
to having a chose in action, if a federal court determines that a class is 
untenable, this right to be a representative becomes meaningless because 
there is no certifiable class to represent.262  However, there is no similar 
justification for failing to provide the other due process protections 
mandated by Shutts.263 
                                                 
257 Id. (“[T]here is no class pending . . . and thus, virtually none of the 5.7 million [absent, 
potential] class members . . . are before this Court in any respect, and there is no basis upon 
which we can infer their consent.”); cf. Coffee, supra note 188, at 35. 
258 Notably, the Third Circuit stated in dicta that it would likely have power to bind those 
over whom it had traditional personal jurisdiction, including the named parties and those 
with minimum contacts with the forum state.  GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d at 141 n.2.; see supra 
notes 185-88. 
259 See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 811-12. 
260 Id. at 807; see Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); Pennell, 
supra note 95, at 483 (defining “chose in action”). 
261 Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d 763, 769 (7th Cir. 2003); see Shutts, 472 U.S. at 807 
(citing Mullane, 339 U.S., at 306 for the proposition that “a chose in action is a 
constitutionally recognized property interest possessed by each of the plaintiffs”). 
262 The Supreme Court may hold that there is a need to infer consent to gain power over 
putative class members and bind them to a certification denial.  However, until such a 
holding is put forth, which appears unlikely, courts must use the standard given in Shutts.  
See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 807, 811-12 (stating that an opt out right is needed to infer consent 
when one is going to lose a chose in action).  Because a chose in action is by definition a 
right to recover damages, and putative class members still have this right after a denial of 
class certification, Shutts is distinguishable from the case at hand regarding the issue of 
implied consent.  See id.  One plausible argument for extending the opt out right is that if 
the claims of the class members are small enough, they will never have their day in court.  
However, this is unpersuasive because it is not the best way to balance the due process 
rights of the putative class with the judiciary’s interest in an effective and efficient 
certification process.  Instead, this Note suggests that offering notice, an opportunity to be 
heard, and adequate representation during the certification proceedings, followed by 
binding the putative class to the decision of the court, is a better solution.  See infra Part V. 
263 See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812; see also infra Part IV.B.2. 
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2. Finding the Appropriate Balance—Adequate Representation, Notice, 
and a Right to Be Heard Must Be Provided 
An examination of both Shutts and Rule 23 lead to the same 
conclusion:  In order to have constitutional power to bind the putative 
class, there must be adequate representation, notice, and an opportunity 
to be heard.264  The Third Circuit realized this but went too far in 
requiring the right to opt out of the class.265  The Seventh Circuit 
dispatched with the need for a right to opt out but only required 
adequate representation.266  Both courts missed the mark.  There is no 
justification for failing to give notice and an opportunity to be heard 
before binding putative class members to a decision.267 
Adequate representation is essential to gaining power over putative 
class members; it is the most important due process protection involved 
in class action proceedings.268  However, without notice the protection of 
adequate representation is diminished greatly because the class cannot 
effectively monitor the proceedings.269  One commentator eloquently 
stated that those in the best position to determine the adequacy of 
representation are those being represented.270 
                                                 
264 See supra Part II.B.1-2 for a discussion of Rule 23 and the Shutts doctrine. 
265 See supra Part IV.B.1. 
266 Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 769 (“Yet no statute or rule requires notice, and an 
opportunity to opt out, before the certification decision is made; it is a post-certification 
step.”); see Joseph M. McLaughlin, Directors’ and Officers’ Liability, 230 N.Y. L.J. 5, 6 (2003) 
(noting that if defense attorneys want to use this reasoning, it may be wise not to challenge 
the adequacy of representation during the initial certification proceedings). 
267 See infra notes 268-81 and accompanying text. 
268 See State v. Homeside Lending, Inc., 826 A.2d 997, 1012 (Vt. 2003) (“It is often labeled 
the most important of due process requirements.”); Bassett, supra note 44, at 49 
(“[A]dequate representation remains the absolute baseline of due process in class 
actions.”).  Even the Seventh Circuit required a showing of adequate representation before 
finding power over putative class members.  See Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 769 
(noting that no one had challenged adequacy in the trial court or on appeal, and thus it was 
assuming there was adequate representation).  However, the traditional conception of 
adequate representation does not apply directly to certification proceedings because courts 
generally determine whether the class representative and the class counsel will be adequate 
to represent the interests of the class after certification.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (requiring 
that, in order to certify a class, the class representative must be able to adequately represent 
the interests of the class throughout the course of the litigation); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(B) 
(requiring that if an attorney is appointed class counsel, he must at all times adequately 
represent the class). 
269 See Miller & Crump, supra note 82, at 11-12. 
270 See Bronsteen & Fiss, supra note 70, at 1435 (noting that those in the best position to 
determine the adequacy of the representation are the class members themselves). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 1 [2004], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol39/iss1/5
2004] Effective Class Certification 133 
 
Functionally, if notice were given to putative class members, 
adequacy of representation would be monitored as follows.  After 
receiving notice, members of Rule 23(b)(3) classes would first have the 
right to enter an appearance in the litigation.271  After entering an 
appearance, they could receive copies of all the pleadings and notice of 
all hearings.272  This would allow members to determine if intervention is 
warranted.273  If they could successfully challenge the adequacy of 
representation right away, either the class would not be certified, the 
putative class member challenging the representation would become the 
new representative, or the challenger would be able to intervene as of 
right.274  If there were an unsuccessful attempt to contest the 
representation immediately, the class member could seek permissive 
intervention in order to represent his own interests.275  However, just by 
being involved in the class certification process, the class member would 
be able to influence the determination of whether the other factors for 
class certification are met and what decisions are made by the 
                                                 
271 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (providing that absent class members must be given 
notice and informed “that a class member may enter an appearance through counsel if the 
member so desires”); Kaplan, supra note 132, at 392 (stating that courts have interpreted 
this rule, formerly Rule 23(c)(2)(C), to allow for this type of limited participation in order to 
provide a basis on which to decide whether or not to intervene). 
272 See, e.g., Ramsey v. Arata, 406 F. Supp. 435, 442 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (interpreting Rule 
23(c)(2)(C), which is now Rule 23(c)(2)(B) after the 2003 Amendment). 
273 See id. 
274 Bronsteen & Fiss, supra note 70, at 1439.  Rule 24(a) allows for intervention as of right 
if there is inadequate representation.  Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)).  Some have argued 
that there should be an absolute right to intervene in class actions without a showing of 
inadequate representation, which is currently required under Rule 24(a).  See Woolley, 
supra note 103, at 580, 607 (arguing that this right should only be tempered by an exception 
in extreme cases where manageability becomes a problem); Cohn, supra note 133, at 1223-24 
(arguing for a right to intervene with limitations on the activities of intervenors); see also 
supra notes 130-33 for a discussion of intervention and the right to be heard in class actions.  
Because the purpose of intervention is partly to monitor representation, there should not be 
a need to show that the representation needs to be replaced in order to intervene.  Woolley, 
supra note 103, at 607.  Although creating a right to intervene could lead to problems of 
manageability, it is unlikely to do so because of the cost of intervention.  See Willging, supra 
note 1, at 139 (noting that in one study of four federal district courts, there were attempts to 
intervene in only 11%, 9%, 5%, and 0% of the cases in each district, respectively).  
Substantial attorney fees, which will not normally be recoverable from the class funds in 
the absence of inadequate representation, and other hardships will keep class members 
from intervening.  Woolley, supra note 103, at 608-609. 
275 Woolley, supra note 103, at 605-06; see FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b) (allowing for permissive 
intervention even in the absence of inadequate representation).  Fiss and Bronsteen argue 
that intervention should be a qualified right in class actions.  Bronsteen & Fiss, supra note 
70, at 1441.  For example, if there are hundreds of intervention requests, some could be 
rejected without diminishing the watchdog nature of intervention and thus would not 
cause the litigation to get out of control.  Id. 
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representative.276  Additionally, an intervening class member would be 
considered a party who is able to petition a court of appeals for review of 
the certification decision under Rule 23(f).277  If notice were not required 
before certification, those who would otherwise be involved in the 
litigation would not know about it. 
In class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(3), absent class members 
must generally be afforded “the best notice practicable under the 
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be 
identified through reasonable effort.”278  The requirement of individual 
notice is based on the idea that courts must infer consent in order for 
there to be power to bind absent class members to a judgment.279  
However, if the need to infer consent is not necessary before certification, 
there is no need to require individual notice.280  Rather, a discretionary 
scheme, allowing the best notice practicable at all times, could be used 
for pre-certification notice.281 
3. Treating Putative Class Members as Parties to Procedural Events to 
Justify Withholding Notice Is Not Appropriate 
The Third Circuit held that putative class members were not 
parties.282  Four years later, the Supreme Court decided Devlin, which 
posited a flexible approach, based on the goals of class action litigation, 
                                                 
276 See Bronsteen & Fiss, supra note 70, at 1441; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23 cmt. (d)(2) 
(“[N]otice may encourage interventions to improve the representation of the class.”); 
Oppenheimer v. F. J. Young & Co., 144 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1944). 
277 Rule 23(f) took effect in 1998, the same year as the Third Circuit decided GM Trucks II.  
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f); GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d 133, 141 (3d Cir. 1998). 
278 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B). 
279 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985). 
280 See supra Part IV.B.1 for a discussion of how implied consent is irrelevant before 
certification of a class. 
281 Courts should consider various factors in determining what notice is proper, 
including cost of notice, which will vary depending on the size of class and the means 
available.  Bronsteen & Fiss, supra note 70, at 1438.  Another factor is the importance of 
reaching every member; small claims without a realistic chance of an individual action 
being brought create the situation in which it is not that important that individual notice be 
given, whereas if there were large claims with great differences in the amount of damages, 
individual notice would probably be the best notice practicable.  Id.  An additional factor 
would be the interest in the private enforcement of public laws.  Id. 
282 GM Trucks II, 134 F.3d at 141.  In discussing whether there was power to enjoin 
putative class members from trying to certify the same nationwide class in a Louisiana 
state court, the court stated:  “To be more precise, the Louisiana class members are not parties 
before us; they have not constructively or affirmatively consented to personal jurisdiction; 
and they do not, as far as has been demonstrated, have minimum contacts with 
Pennsylvania.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
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to determine whether absent class members should be considered parties 
to a procedural event.283  The Seventh Circuit used the Devlin decision as 
support for treating putative class members as parties to the certification 
proceedings and binding them to a certification decision without notice 
or an opportunity to be heard.284 
Normally in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, class members are not 
considered parties and are not bound by a judgment unless they receive 
notice and refuse to exercise a right to opt out of the class.285  However, 
in light of Devlin, the inquiry becomes whether the goals of class action 
litigation support finding that putative class members are parties to the 
certification proceedings.286  Here it is instructive to look at past 
instances in which absent class members were treated as parties.287 
The Seventh Circuit tried to equate certification proceedings to the 
facts of Devlin by stating that the putative class members had the right to 
seek certiorari after its decision.288  In Devlin, the Court held that absent 
class members were parties to the litigation for the purpose of appealing 
an overruled objection made at a settlement fairness hearing.289  The 
Court considered two factors in its determination:  (1) the fact that the 
objector had interests divergent from the class representative, as shown 
through objecting at the settlement fairness hearing, and (2) the binding 
effect of the judgment on the objector.290 
The Seventh Circuit’s analogy to Devlin was inappropriate for a 
number of reasons.  First and most striking, Devlin involved a certified 
class in which the class members had received notice of the proposed 
                                                 
283 See Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, supra note 143, at 336 (quoting Devlin v. 
Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 19-20 (2002)). 
284 See Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 333 F.3d 763, 768-69 (7th Cir. 2003).  Although the 
court was careful to use the phrase “class member” throughout its opinion when referring 
to putative class members, it did slip once when it stated that “any would-be member of 
the class could have sought certiorari from our adverse decision.”  Id. at 768. 
285 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2) (stating that Rule 23(b)(3) class members are bound by the 
judgment if notice and an opportunity to opt out are given); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 (1985). 
286 See Devlin, 536 U.S. at 5-6. 
287 See supra Part II.C for a discussion of the history of treating absent class members as 
parties for procedural events. 
288 Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 768 (citing Devlin, 531 U.S. at 14).  Rule 23(f) allows 
the appeals court power to grant an appeal of the class certification decision if the request is 
made within ten days of the decision.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). 
289 Devlin, 536 U.S. at 14; cf. Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, supra note 143, at 332. 
290 Devlin, 536 U.S. at 10. 
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settlement.291  The dissent in Devlin aptly stated that “[n]ot even 
petitioner . . . [was] willing to advance the novel and surely erroneous 
argument that a nonnamed class member is a party to the class-action 
litigation before the class is certified.”292  Second, the class members in 
Devlin had to object at the fairness hearing, so they had initiated some 
action to bring themselves before the court.293  The Seventh Circuit was 
dealing with putative class members that had not taken any affirmative 
steps to bring themselves before the court.294  Third, the Devlin Court was 
attempting to keep class members in the class action litigation, and the 
Seventh Circuit was attempting to keep class members out of the 
litigation.295  Finally, Devlin required a binding effect on a class member 
in order to be considered a party.296  However, the Seventh Circuit 
considered the putative class members parties that could be bound by a 
judgment.297  Thus, in order to make Devlin applicable to certification 
attempts, the Seventh Circuit would have to use its holding 
retroactively.298 
The only time putative class members have been bound as parties for 
purposes similar to the class certification issue is for purposes of the 
tolling rule.299  If any member of the putative class files an action seeking 
class treatment, putative class members receive the benefit of a tolled 
statute of limitations from the time the action is filed until the denial of 
certification.300  Tolling the statute of limitations does not itself involve 
litigating anything per se; it just allows the putative class members to 
receive the benefit.301  However, the denial of class certification, by 
definition, involves litigation.  Thus, notice would not help to more 
effectively toll the statute of limitations, but notice would definitely 
provide for better litigation of the certification issue and proper 
monitoring of the representation.302 
                                                 
291 Compare Devlin, 536 U.S. at 5-6, with Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 768-69. 
292 Devlin, 536 U.S. at 16 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
293 Id. at 5; see supra notes 138-40 for a discussion of how the federal rules contemplate 
active participation to receive party status. 
294 Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 768. 
295 Compare Devlin, 536 U.S. at 5-6, with Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 768-69. 
296 Devlin, 536 U.S. at 10. 
297 Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 768. 
298 See id. 
299 See supra Part II.C. 
300 See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text. 
301 See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text. 
302 See supra Part II.B.3. 
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As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, there are no procedural 
events in which absent class members have been treated as parties that 
are sufficiently analogous to class certification proceedings to justify 
treating putative class members as parties to such proceedings.  
Therefore, the Seventh Circuit’s use of this doctrine to justify its refusal 
to give notice was improper.303  Consequently, there is no justification for 
binding putative class members without providing notice.304  Courts can 
only gain power to bind putative class members by offering notice, an 
opportunity to be heard, and adequate representation.305 
V.  PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RULE 23 
As was discussed in Part IV, allowing numerous certification 
attempts by absent class members often renders federal decisions 
meaningless because any state court judge can certify a nationwide class 
similar to one rejected by a federal court.306  Defendants are left uncertain 
about the validity of a federal decision and rush into settlements 
needlessly.307  In addition, repeated litigation of the same issue wastes a 
tremendous amount of judicial resources.308 
Part IV also showed how no court has provided an adequate 
solution to these problems while affording due process.309  Further, the 
recent amendment to Rule 23 also did not address these issues, even 
though it was amended in December 2003.310  Consequently, this Note 
suggests another amendment to Rule 23, one which incorporates the 
right to injunctive relief against relitigation of the certification issue in 
other jurisdictions and affords the due process protections of notice, an 
opportunity to be heard, and adequate representation to the putative 
class.  This scheme will allow federal courts to prevent undue repetition 
of the certification issue while having constitutional power over the 
putative class. 
Courts should be given wide discretion to fashion the best notice 
practicable under the circumstances before certification, without being 
required to give individual notice.  Individual notice should only be 
                                                 
303 See supra Part IV.B.3. 
304 See supra Part IV.B.2. 
305 See supra Part IV.B.2. 
306 See supra Part IV.A. 
307 See supra notes 235-40 and accompanying text. 
308 See supra notes 241-42 and accompanying text. 
309 See supra Part IV. 
310 See supra note 69 for a discussion of the 2003 Amendment to Rule 23. 
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required after certification because its purpose is to allow for consent to 
be inferred from the absent members of certified classes.  Pre-
certification notice has the purpose of allowing an opportunity to be 
heard as a way to monitor the class representation.  This goal can be 
accomplished without requiring individual notice.  Additionally, 
because seeking an injunction puts the defendant in the position of a 
plaintiff seeking relief, the court should have discretion to force a 
defendant to reimburse the plaintiff for the notice costs if an injunction is 
granted. 
This proposed amendment to Rule 23(c) effectively balances the 
interests involved.  It protects the putative class members’ due process 
rights and their interests in effectively monitoring the class 
representation.  It also satisfies the defendants’ interests in finality and 
cost reduction.  Finally, it allows for judicial economy and attempts to 
ensure that no federal court decisions will be rendered meaningless. 
Proposed Amendment to Rule 23(c)311 
(c) Determining by Order Whether to Certify a Class 
Action; Appointing Class Counsel; Notice and 
Membership in Class; Judgment; Multiple Classes and 
Subclasses. 
(1)(A) When a person sues or is sued as a representative 
of a class, the court must--at an early practicable time--
determine by order whether to certify the action as a 
class action. 
(B) An order certifying a class action must define the 
class and the class claims, issues, or defenses, and must 
appoint class counsel under Rule 23(g). 
(C) An order under Rule 23(c)(1) may be altered or 
amended before final judgment. 
(2)(A) For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (2), 
the court may direct appropriate notice to the class. 
                                                 
311 The proposed amendments are italicized and are the contribution of the author.  See 
generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (amended December 1, 2003); Part II.B.1 (discussing 
provisions of the current Rule 23). 
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(B) Upon a motion to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3), the 
court must direct to the putative class members the best 
notice practicable under the circumstances, and if the 
class is certified there must be individual notice to all 
members who can be identified through reasonable 
effort.  Notice, whether given before or after certification, 
must concisely and clearly state in plain, easily 
understood language: 
• the nature of the action, 
• the definition of the purported class or certified class, 
• the class claims, issues, or defenses, 
• that a class member of a certified or putative class may 
enter an appearance through counsel if the member so 
desires 
• that the court will exclude from the certified class any 
member who requests exclusion, stating when and how 
members may elect to be excluded, and 
• the binding effect of a class judgment on class 
members under Rule 23(c)(3) or in the event that the court 
grants an injunction under Rule 23(c)(2)(C). 
(C) Once pre-certification notice has been given, and a 
motion to certify a class under Rule 23 (b)(3) has been 
denied, the court may enjoin the entire putative class 
from attempting to certify the same or a substantially 
similar multistate class in a different forum upon motion 
of any party. 
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class 
action under subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not 
favorable to the class, shall include and describe those 
whom the court finds to be members of the class. The 
judgment in an action maintained as a class action under 
subdivision (b)(3), whether or not favorable to the class, 
shall include and specify or describe those to whom the 
notice provided in subdivision (c)(2) was directed, and 
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who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court 
finds to be members of the class. 
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or 
maintained as a class action with respect to particular 
issues, or (B) a class may be divided into subclasses and 
each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of 
this rule shall then be construed and applied 
accordingly. 
Proposed Official Comments:312 
Note to Subdivision (c)(2)(B) 
Pre-Certification Notice 
Courts are now required to give notice to the members 
of putative classes before the certification decision is 
made when the plaintiff is seeking certification under 
Rule 23(b)(3).  This notice will allow for all putative class 
members to have the opportunity to enter an appearance 
and intervene if appropriate. 
The “best notice practicable under the circumstances” 
standard is retained, but there is no requirement of 
individual notice prior to certification even if it would be 
reasonable under the circumstances.  Courts must be 
given wide latitude to fashion notice to meet the best 
practicable standard, which could include individual 
notice.  In determining what constitutes the best notice 
practicable, courts must look to a number of factors 
including, but not limited to, the following:  the cost of 
notice, the size of the claims, and the possibility of 
individual actions being pursued. 
The rule that plaintiffs pay the cost of notice has not 
been changed by this Amendment.  However, if a 
defendant seeks an injunction under Rule 23(c)(2)(C), 
they are in essence a plaintiff seeking relief from the 
court.  Thus, courts may condition granting an 
                                                 
312 These comments are the contribution of the author. 
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injunction on the defendant reimbursing the class 
plaintiff for the costs of notice paid. 
Right to Request Exclusion 
This rule does not require the right to request exclusion 
from the class certification proceeding in order to be 
bound to the certification decision because there is no 
need to infer consent, as no chose in action will be lost.  
By definition, the putative class members retain their 
right to bring individual actions after certification of a 
class is denied. 
However, if a class is certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the 
court must afford the right to opt out of the class in 
order to bind class members to a judgment.  As such, 
courts must require reasonable individual notice after 
certification.  It is contemplated that the aggregate cost 
of notice given before and after certification will be 
comparable to notice given only after certification under 
the previous rule. 
Additionally, the problems created for putative class 
members in the absence of a right to opt out of the class 
certification proceedings are de minimus.  In three of the 
four possible scenarios, the putative class member 
would experience no problem when faced with no right 
to opt out of the class certification proceeding.  First, if 
the class is certified, the right to opt out will still be 
given.  Second, someone who would choose not to opt 
out of the certification proceedings would not be 
adversely affected by the lack of a right to opt out of the 
class.  Third, if someone wanted to opt out and pursue 
an individual action, he could still do so because no 
chose in action is lost when certification is denied.  The 
fourth scenario raises more issues.  If someone wanted 
to opt out of the class certification proceedings and 
attempt to certify the class in another forum, he would 
be foreclosed from doing so by an injunction authorized 
under Rule 23(c)(2)(C).  The loss of this person’s right to 
attempt to certify the class is one of the trade-offs of a 
more efficient class certification procedure.  
Additionally, this problem is moderated by allowing 
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notice, a right to enter an appearance, and potentially to 
intervene.  This will allow those that want to be involved 
in the class certification proceedings an opportunity to 
do so. 
Note to Subdivision (c)(2)(C) 
Power to Enjoin 
The injunctive power given to courts under this rule is in 
addition to that offered by the All Writs Act.313  This rule 
allows courts to enjoin the entire putative class from 
attempting to certify the same or a substantially similar 
class in another forum after certification is denied.  This 
injunctive power is intended to work in connection with 
the rights to receive notice and to intervene, which are 
given to the class members in order to provide the most 
effective litigation of the class certification issue.  This 
rule creates an exception to the general rule that the 
subsequent forum determines the preclusive effect of a 
judgment.314  This is due in large part to the problems 
associated with multistate class actions, in which there is 
the realistic possibility of repeated litigation on the same 
issue in numerous courts. 
These proposed amendments to Rule 23(c) would allow for a fully 
litigated class certification decision made by a federal court to be given 
effect while still affording due process to all concerned.  It would also 
solve many of the problems raised in the hypothetical described in Part I.  
As described in the Introduction, StarBrothers, Inc. was sued by Albert in 
a products liability action in federal court based on his injuries caused by 
a defective table saw.  Albert attempted to certify the class under Rule 
23(b)(3), but the class was found untenable.  Subsequently, an absent 
class member attempted to certify the same class in a state court in a 
different jurisdiction.  StarBrothers was unable to argue collateral 
estoppel because the absent class member was not a party to the original 
federal court proceedings.  Consequently, StarBrothers was faced with 
litigating the certification issue again.  Further, the absent class member 
                                                 
313 See 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000). 
314 See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330 (1979). 
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could not have participated in the original federal proceeding, even if he 
wanted to, because he did not receive notice. 
If the proposed rule were in effect and notice, the opportunity to be 
heard, and adequate representation were given before the certification 
decision was made in the federal court, the court would have had power 
to bind the putative class to the certification decision.  StarBrothers could 
then move the federal court to enjoin further certification attempts by 
anyone in the putative class.  This injunction would prevent 
StarBrothers’ from having to litigate the same issue multiple times and 
would further the goal of judicial economy.  In addition, although the 
cost of notice would have been paid by Albert, the original class plaintiff, 
the court could require StarBrothers to reimburse Albert for the notice 
costs before issuing the injunction.   
If the proposed rule were in effect, Albert likely would have received 
pre-certification notice of the federal proceedings and would have had a 
right to enter an appearance and possibly intervene.  Even if the federal 
court did not require individual notice and Albert did not actually 
receive notice, it is safe to say that enough absent class members would 
have received notice and participated in the action so that there would 
have been adequate monitoring of the representation to protect Albert’s 
interests. 
As with any complex problem, there are limitations to this proposed 
solution.  The Anti-Injunction Act may bar the injunctive power granted 
by this proposed rule if the state court proceeding had begun prior to the 
federal court’s certification decision, and the Third Circuit’s approach to 
applying the relitigation exception would then be applicable.315  
However, in any case in which an absent class member brings a 
subsequent action to certify a class, the injunctive power given by this 
proposed rule will have full force.  In addition, if the Seventh Circuit’s 
interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Act is applied, the rule will almost 
always have full force.316 
This proposed rule relates to attempts to certify classes under Rule 
23(b)(3) and does not discuss (b)(1) or (b)(2) class actions.317  However, 
this Note does recognize that plaintiffs’ pleadings may contain 
                                                 
315 See supra notes 189-94, 216-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Anti-
Injunction Act and the current split on whether the class certification decision should fall 
within the relitigation exception to the Act. 
316 See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text. 
317 See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of Rule 23(b). 
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allegations that a putative class fits into more than one class or that the 
class may be denied for failure to meet the requirements of Rule 23(a).318  
This proposed rule is intended to address situations in which it is pled 
that the class is certifiable under Rule 23(b)(3).  It properly balances the 
interests of putative class members, potential defendants, and the 
judiciary.  It gives credence to potential federal court decisions where the 
Third Circuit’s approach would not, while affording putative class 
members due process where the Seventh Circuit’s approach would 
not.319 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is a complex issue that raises 
difficult problems, especially regarding the rights of absent class 
members.  The issue becomes even fuzzier when dealing with the rights 
of putative class members after certification is denied.  Clearly, allowing 
members of a putative class numerous attempts to litigate the class 
certification issue after a federal court has found the class untenable is 
problematic.  It unduly taxes defendants and the judicial system. 
This Note proposes a more workable certification procedure that 
would allow federal courts to grant injunctions that prevent putative 
class members from attempting to certify the same or a substantially 
similar class in a different forum after the federal court has denied 
certification.  The Seventh Circuit used this approach, but it did not 
afford due process to the people it was enjoining.  It relied merely on the 
adequacy of representation to gain power over the putative class. 
Traditionally, in order to bind absent class members of a Rule 
23(b)(3) class, a court must afford the class due process by giving them 
notice, an opportunity to be heard, adequate representation, and the 
right to opt out of the class.  When the Third Circuit applied this test to 
putative class members, it unnecessarily required the right to opt out 
because, in its rigid adherence to the Shutts doctrine, it reasoned that it 
needed to infer consent from the putative class members. However, this 
was not necessary because their chose in action remains intact after 
certification is denied. 
                                                 
318 See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of Rule 23(a). 
319 See supra Part III for a description of the different approaches taken by these circuit 
courts to the problems surrounding numerous certification attempts. 
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The approach suggested by this Note is that Rule 23(c) should be 
amended to allow federal courts power to enjoin the putative class after 
they are given the best notice practicable, an opportunity to be heard, 
and adequate representation.  Because the purpose of pre-certification 
notice is not to infer consent, but rather to provide a check on the 
adequacy of representation, individual notice need not be required.  
Additionally, because the defendant steps into the shoes of the plaintiff 
when asking for the equitable remedy of an injunction, courts must have 
discretion to force defendants to reimburse class plaintiffs for the costs of 
notice paid if an injunction is issued.  These changes to Rule 23(c) 
provide a workable solution to the problems presented in the context of 
class certification under Rule 23(b)(3).  The putative class members are 
afforded due process, the burdens on defendants are reduced, and the 
judiciary’s interests in economy and finality are satisfied. 
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